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When the WTO Works, and How It Fails 
 
Anu Bradford1 
 
 
This Article seeks to explain when an international legal framework like the WTO 
can facilitate international cooperation and when it fails to do so. Using an empirical 
inquiry into different agreements that the WTO has attempted to facilitate—specifically 
intellectual property and antitrust regulation—it reveals more general principles about 
when and why the WTO can facilitate agreement in some situations and not others. 
Comparing the successful conclusion of the TRIPs Agreement and the failed attempts to 
negotiate a WTO antitrust agreement reveal that international cooperation is likely to 
emerge when the interests of powerful states are closely aligned and when concentrated 
interest groups within those states actively support cooperation. They further suggest that 
the WTO provides an optimal forum for cooperation when states need to rely on cross-
issue linkages to overcome existing distributional conflicts, when the underlying issue 
calls for an enforcement mechanism, or when both the net benefits of the agreement and 
the opportunity costs of non-agreement are high. Contrasting the key differences between 
IP and antitrust cooperation, this Article disputes the widely held view that the strategic 
situation underlying IP and antitrust cooperation are similar and that the conclusion of 
the TRIPs Agreement is a relevant precedent predicting a successful WTO negotiation on 
antitrust or a host of other new regulatory issues Given the ongoing changes in the 
economic and political landscape, cooperation in the WTO is even more challenging 
today and it is possible that—absent institutional reforms—the WTO’s recent expansion 
may well have met its limits.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
International efforts to seek regulatory convergence produce strikingly different 
results even in situations where economic implications of the regulatory regimes appear 
similar. For instance, the enforcement of antitrust laws and the protection of intellectual 
property rights (“IPRs”) across the jurisdictions have enormous implications for major 
economic powers and domestic constituencies within those powers, creating pressures for 
international cooperation. Yet the efforts to harmonize the two regulatory regimes have 
followed very different paths. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPs”) was a contentious matter with enormous distributional 
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the University of Chicago, Northwestern University Law School, and the ASIL International Economic 
Law Interest Group Research Colloquium at the UCLA Law School. The author would like to thank Hanna 
Chung and Amanda Gomez for excellent research assistance.  
3 
 
consequences. Nevertheless, states agreed to incorporate IPRs into the WTO in 1995. In 
contrast, various attempts to launch WTO negotiations on antitrust have all failed.2 
Instead, states have sought to minimize negative externalities of decentralized antitrust 
enforcement by engaging in case-by-case enforcement cooperation and by developing 
recommendations and best practices to foster voluntary convergence of their respective 
antitrust regimes.3  
 
The successful incorporation of IPRs into the WTO cultivated a sense of false 
optimism on the inherently flexible boundaries of the WTO, fostering a belief that the 
trade regime is capable of accommodating a host of new issues, including antitrust, 
investment, corruption, labor, and environment, among others.4 Scholars have thus far 
concentrated on assessing the normative desirability of expanding the WTO’s mandate to 
these new issue areas. The most cohesive attempt to do this took place when the 
American Journal of International Law published a symposium issue on the boundaries of 
the WTO.5 In the symposium, several prominent trade scholars sought to develop criteria 
that can be used to assess whether any given issue belongs to the trade institution or 
whether it should be regulated elsewhere.  
 
This Article examines the institutional boundaries of the WTO from a descriptive 
perspective. It seeks to identify conditions that explain and predict when an international 
legal framework like the WTO can advance international cooperation and when it fails to 
do so. It departs from the existing scholarly debate on the substantive scope of the WTO, 
which focuses on the question of the normative desirability of expanding the boundaries 
of the WTO and the development of criteria in selecting issues that should be brought 
into the WTO. Instead, it focuses on the feasibility of the WTO agreement, seeking to 
understand when the WTO works and when it does not, given the characteristics of the 
underlying issue of cooperation, constraints that stem from power politics and domestic 
political economy, and the comparative institutional advantages of the WTO. Thus, the 
goal is to define the institutional scope of the WTO by isolating the predominant 
variables that determine when an agreement within this regime is likely to materialize 
and when states are likely to turn to alternative regulatory regimes instead.  
 
The Article begins with a standard assumption that international cooperation is 
more likely to emerge when the interests of powerful states are closely aligned and when 
concentrated and influential interest groups within those states support the agreement. 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., PHILIP MARSDEN, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE WTO, ch. 1 (Cameron May 2003). Most 
recently, the WTO negotiations on antitrust were stalled in Cancun in 2003 due to the resistance of the 
developing countries. On August 1, 2004 the WTO General Council decided officially to drop antitrust 
policy from the Doha Round negotiation agenda (“July decision”). See Decision Adopted by the General 
Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004).  
3 See, e.g., Oliver Budzinski, The International Competition Network: Prospects and Limits on the Road 
towards International Competition Governance, 8 COMP. & CHANGE 223, 223-42 (2004); Anu Piilola, 
Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study of International Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 207, 235–36 (2003); Frederic Jenny, International cooperation on competition: myth, reality and 
perspective, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 973, 973-1003 (2003).  
4 See Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade organization, 96(1) AM. J. INT’L L. 28, 29 (2002). 
5 See generally Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO, 96(1) AM. J. INT’L L. (2002).  
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These factors are often used to explain why international cooperation in a given instance 
has been successful. Without their presence, the prospects for a WTO agreement (or any 
other international treaty) are dim. However, these factors fail to explain when powerful 
states choose to cooperate in the WTO as opposed to another international legal 
framework.  
 
This Article asserts that the WTO offers the optimal legal framework for 
cooperation in the presence of three conditions. First, the WTO is a particularly useful 
vehicle for cooperation when states need to, and are able to, rely on “issue-linkages” to 
overcome existing distributional conflicts. Second, the WTO is also a preferred forum 
when the underlying issue is prone to defection and when sustainable cooperation 
therefore calls for an enforcement mechanism. Finally, states are more likely to pursue 
cooperation in the WTO in the presence of high net benefits from cooperation that exceed 
the high costs of formal, institutionalized cooperation.  
 
The Article then moves on to examine these predictors of successful cooperation 
in the context of two in-depth case studies—the successful conclusion of the TRIPs 
Agreement and the failed attempts to negotiate a WTO antitrust agreement. There are five 
fundamental differences between the strategic situations characterizing these two areas of 
cooperation. First, the great economic powers all supported the TRIPs Agreement but 
disagreed on the need to negotiate a WTO antitrust agreement. Second, influential 
interest groups within the great powers unequivocally endorsed the TRIPs Agreement, 
while there has been little, if any, interest-group support for the international antitrust 
agreement. Third, transfer payments in the form of issue-linkages were successfully 
employed to address the unequal distributional consequences of the TRIPs Agreement. In 
contrast, ex ante uncertainty regarding the winners and losers under the prospective 
antitrust agreement obstructed states’ ability to devise these types of issue linkages and, 
as a result, compromised their ability to solve the distributional conflict. Fourth, defection 
from a prospective agreement was a concern underlying the TRIPs negotiations, 
rendering the WTO and its Dispute Settlement Mechanism (“DSM”) particularly 
attractive for the TRIPs Agreement. In contrast, the likelihood of defection and hence the 
need for an enforcement mechanism was a lesser concern in antitrust negotiations, 
diminishing the need to pursue cooperation within the WTO. Finally, the benefits of 
cooperating and the opportunity costs of not cooperating in the WTO were significantly 
higher with respect to IPRs than they were in the case of antitrust, reinforcing the case for 
the TRIPs Agreement and making the case for a WTO antitrust agreement less 
compelling.  
 
By unveiling the key differences between these two areas of cooperation, this 
Article challenges the widely held view that the strategic situation underlying IPR and 
antitrust cooperation would be very similar and that the TRIPs Agreement would 
therefore offer an instructive precedent for successful WTO antitrust negotiations.6 A 
closer examination of the two areas of cooperation reveals that the TRIPs negotiations 
                                                 
6 Andrew Guzman has developed a most detailed argument on why the TRIPs negotiations should be 
instructive to the antitrust negotiations. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, International Antitrust and the WTO: 
The Lesson from Intellectual Property, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 933, 935 (2003).  
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and the antitrust negotiations have, in fact, very little in common. Given that the 
dynamics underlying antitrust cooperation would—at least intuitively—appear to be most 
similar to those underlying cooperation on IPRs, the two case studies also cast doubt on 
the ability of the TRIPs Agreement to provide a template in other proposed areas of 
cooperation such as environment or labor, where the political economy conditions seem 
further removed from those underlying the TRIPs negotiations.  
 
The two case studies also challenge certain standard assumptions on international 
cooperation. The WTO rules are based on consensus, suggesting that any given 
agreement that is reached ought to be Pareto-improving for all the members of the 
organization. If an agreement were to make any state worse off, that state would use its 
veto rights to block the agreement.7 This is consistent with any rational choice model that 
assumes that states pursue international cooperation only when benefits from such 
cooperation exceed the costs involved. However, the examination of the TRIPs and 
antitrust negotiations reveal that certain zero-sum agreements that leave some states 
worse off (such as TRIPs) do materialize within the WTO whereas win-win agreements 
that are widely considered to be Pareto-improving for all states (such as antitrust) can be 
unsuccessful.8 One of the goals of this Article is to explain why this happens. Similarly, 
conventional wisdom suggests that cooperation is less likely in the presence of stark 
distributional conflicts or incentives to defect. However, this Article argues that it is 
exactly in the presence of these two conditions when a WTO agreement is most likely to 
emerge. Consequently, a more nuanced theory on cooperation within the WTO is needed.  
 
The Article proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the institutional capacity of 
the WTO, laying out key predictors of when the WTO can advance international 
cooperation and when it fails to do so. Section II examines these predictors through a 
case study focusing on two prominent WTO negotiations—the successful TRIPs 
negotiations and the failed antitrust negotiations—and identifies the key differences 
between the two areas of cooperation. These differences, the Article argues, capture the 
very conditions that allow us to predict whether cooperation in the WTO is feasible. The 
conclusion discusses the prospects of future cooperation in the WTO, applying the 
lessons from the case studies to the changing political and economic landscape in which 
the WTO negotiations are likely to take place in the future.  
  
I. A Theory of Cooperation in the WTO  
 
The WTO is often hailed as the most effective international institution. With a 
broad membership and an extensive set of internationally binding obligations, the WTO 
has ensured that states open their borders by lowering tariffs and removing various non-
tariff barriers that restrict international trade. More open trade has secured worldwide 
                                                 
7 Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in 
the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339, 345 (2002). Similarly, a state might block agreements that resulted in 
positive-sum outcomes if such an agreement inequitably distributed the benefits among the trading 
partners.  
8 See Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing World: Crisis, 
Coercion, and Choice, 49 INT’L ORG. 315, 315-50 (1995) (surmising that TRIPs should have been harder to 
agree as all states had something to gain from at least some minimum set of antitrust laws).  
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economic growth and increased prosperity across the global markets. While trade 
liberalization has its critics, few would suggest that the WTO has not accomplished its 
primary mission of reducing obstacles to international trade. Much of the WTO’s success 
is attributed to its ability to enforce commitments through its dispute settlement 
mechanism. This sets the WTO apart from most other international institutions that lack 
means to hold states accountable for the breach of their obligations. Unlike much of 
international law, the WTO obligations constitute “hard law” that is backed by sanctions. 
This feature has also cultivated a perception of distinct effectiveness of WTO 
agreements, resulting in pressures to incorporate a number of new issues into the WTO.  
 
The attempts to link various “nontrade” issues into the WTO have become a 
subject of extensive debate and controversy.9 There is no shortage of advocates—whether 
diplomats or governments, scholars, private interests or non-governmental 
organizations—arguing for or against the expansion of the traditional trade agenda to new 
areas of cooperation. These disagreements have derailed Ministerial meetings and 
collapsed negotiations, undermining the credibility of the WTO and at times calling into 
question the entire mission of the trade regime.10 Unfortunately, the extensive debates 
have all failed to provide explicit criteria or a coherent analytical framework for assessing 
the optimal scope of the WTO.  
 
Any normative discussion on the boundaries of the WTO needs a more solid 
positive foundation that includes a more nuanced understanding of the institutional 
capacity of the WTO. International relations literature has generated ambivalent and often 
contradictory insights on situations where international institutions can facilitate 
cooperation, offering only limited guidance on the circumstances in which agreements 
are likely to emerge in the WTO.11 The discussion below seeks to fill that gap by 
disaggregating the most essential conditions that determine whether WTO agreements are 
likely to succeed or fail. Section A discusses when international cooperation in general is 
feasible. Section B focuses on when such cooperation is likely to take place in the WTO.  
 
A. When Is International Cooperation Feasible?  
 
Two preconditions must be present for any international cooperation to emerge 
irrespective of the institutional form such cooperation ultimately takes. First, powerful 
states must agree on the need and form of cooperation. Second, powerful interest groups 
                                                 
9 See references to this in John H. Jackson, Afterword: the Linkage Problem—Comments on Five Texts, 96 
AM. J. INT’L L. 118, ### (2002).  
10 Id. 
11 The three primary views on the role of institutions offer very different predictions on the WTO’s ability 
to foster agreements among states. The most pessimistic views of international cooperation claim that 
institutions are irrelevant and unable to constrain states. More optimistic advocates of institutions claim that 
institutions exert independent influence on states, constraining states’ self-interested behavior and 
subverting international anarchy that would otherwise prevail. The third view takes the middle road, 
claiming that institutions are constrained by the underlying structure of state interests but that they can still 
mitigate market failures that stem from the anarchic system of international relations. See Daniel Y. Kono, 
Making Anarchy Work: International Legal Institutions and Trade Cooperation, 69 J. POL. 746, 746 
(2007). 
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within those states must support cooperation on the issue area. While these conditions 
apply across the international institutional landscape, they also form a starting point for 
assessing the feasibility of a WTO agreement.  
 
Even though WTO rule-making is based on de facto consensus among all states, 
in practice the legislative outcomes often reflect the underlying power structures of the 
member states.12 In the WTO context, power refers to the relative market size of each 
state. A state with a large domestic market can offer more attractive access to its trading 
partner and thus extract more in return for agreeing to open its domestic market.13 Large 
economies generally benefit from greater internal trade opportunities. Small states are 
therefore more dependent on trade opportunities negotiated in the WTO and less able to 
exert pressure by threatening to close their markets. For instance, the prospect of being 
shut out of the Guatemalan market is far less damaging to the United States than the 
converse prospect of Guatemala losing the opportunity to export to the United States. 
This variance in the opportunity costs of market closure shifts the balance of power 
further toward the large economies.14  
 
The United States and the European Union (“EU”) are the unequivocal powers in 
the WTO system, based on the size of their domestic markets.15 While their relative 
economic dominance is gradually diminishing as emerging economies such as China and 
India continue to grow, the United States and the EU combined still account for one-third 
of all world imports in both manufactured goods and commercial services. In addition, 
the combined GDP of the United States and the EU still constitutes forty percent of the 
world’s total GDP.16  
 
Great powers can take advantage of less powerful states’ dependence on them in 
several ways. In one extreme, great powers can resort to coercive tactics. In the trade 
domain, coercion has typically consisted of economic sanctions (or threats thereof) or 
withdrawal of economic benefits (such as removal of country’s Generalized System of 
Preferences (“GSP”) status that allows it to benefit from more favorable tariff schemes). 
Great powers can also use selective incentives and conditional benefits to persuade less 
powerful countries to adopt their preferred trade policies. They can negotiate conditional 
trade agreements or use their economic leverage through international institutions such as 
World Bank or IMF. Economic assistance that great powers extend to developing 
                                                 
12 See Steinberg, supra note 7.  
13 Steinberg, supra note 7. Any given liberalization measure thus gives greater benefits to a smaller state, 
since it gains proportionately more foreign market access and thereby more welfare and net employment 
gains. 
14 Id. 
15 Steinberg, supra note 7, at 348.  
16 See WSDBHome, http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2010). The United 
States’ share of total world imports was fifteen percent (merchandised goods) and twelve percent 
(commercial services). The EU’s shares were eighteen percent and twenty-three percent, respectively. The 
United States 2006 GDP was $13.2 trillion and EU’s 2006 GDP $12.6 trillion. The total world 2006 GDP 
was approximately $65 trillion. Compare that in 1994, when the Uruguay Round, including the TRIPs 
negotiations, was closed, the combined merchandise imports to the United States and the EU constituted 
forty percent of the world total merchandised imports and their combined GDP represented nearly fifty 
percent of the total world GDP. See id. 
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countries is often conditional on the recipient country adopting progressive economic 
policies and carrying out certain institutional reforms. These tactics steer less powerful 
economies toward regulatory regimes preferred by great powers.  
 
Even if the great powers agreed on the need to cooperate, they are likely to devote 
their limited resources to pursuing cooperation on issues that offer political gains for 
them.17 The prospect of producing concrete benefits to discrete and influential domestic 
interest groups maximizes their political rents from cooperation. Interest groups are likely 
to support an international agreement when expected benefits of the agreement are 
concentrated and costs diffuse.18 Concentrated benefits stimulate organized activity as the 
beneficiaries of the agreement seek to institutionalize their expected gains. At the same 
time, when the costs of an agreement fall on a large number of stakeholders, their 
individual stake in opposing the agreement is not high enough to motivate the formation 
of an effective opposing coalition against the agreement. Thus, the agreement is more 
likely to materialize in the presence of organized activity supporting the agreement and in 
the absence of a tight counter-coalition challenging the agreement.19 
 
B. When Does Cooperation Emerge in the WTO? 
 
Even when the great powers and influential domestic interest groups within those 
powers support international cooperation, it is not evident that states find it rational to 
cooperate within the WTO. At times, states pursue cooperation in another multilateral, 
multi-issue framework20 or within a single-issue organization.21 At other times states 
regard bilateral cooperation as sufficient. The discussion below examines the conditions 
under which the WTO can facilitate regulatory convergence and the conditions under 
which other regimes are preferred. It argues that the WTO offers the most advantageous 
institutional setting for cooperation in the presence of three key attributes: first, when 
deep distributional conflict calls for strategic linkages across issue-areas to forge an 
agreement; second, when high likelihood of defection calls for provisions for monitoring 
and enforcement; and finally, when the availability of high net benefits exceed the high 
costs of long and cumbersome WTO negotiations.  
 
The WTO can facilitate the conclusion of international agreements by enabling 
states to negotiate transfer payments across different issues. If an agreement on a single 
issue area by itself is not feasible, states can broaden the scope for a compromise by 
                                                 
17 Governments negotiating international agreements are assumed to be motivated by both public welfare 
and public choice considerations. 
18 Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 
427, 445 (1988).  
19 James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY: READINGS IN THE POLITICS 
AND ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 86–87 (Thomas Ferguson & Joel Rogers eds., M.E. Sharpe 
1984). 
20 Efforts to pursue international antitrust cooperation have also taken place, for instance, in the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) and the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”). 
21 States also continue to cooperate on IPR issues in the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(“WIPO”). In the absence of progress in the WTO, states have pursued international antitrust cooperation in 
the International Competition Network (“ICN”). 
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strategically linking a contested issue to other items on the trade agenda. “Issue linkage” 
constitutes a side payment where winning states compensate losing states to convince 
them to sign on to the agreement.22 Extending the negotiation agenda increases the 
likelihood that all states can gain from an agreement that is part of the package. Thus, 
issue linkages provide an opportunity to mitigate distributional conflicts, opening up new 
possibilities for efficient agreements.23  
 
Issue linkages are particularly helpful in overcoming domestic resistance to an 
international agreement.24 Broadening the negotiation agenda counteracts protectionist 
coalitions by mobilizing countervailing forces that support trade liberalization. When 
issues are added to the negotiation, new coalitions emerge to counter the protectionist 
sentiments, offering governments political rents that can exceed the costs that the 
protectionist coalition incurs.25 Grouping multiple issues in a single negotiation also 
constrains the ability of a single ministry to block negotiations. For instance, the Ministry 
of Agriculture in France would at all times resist an international agreement that curtailed 
France’s ability to subsidize its farmers. But when agriculture is incorporated in a multi-
issue WTO negotiation, the relative influence of the Ministry of Agriculture is diluted 
due to the involvement of other domestic ministries with interests that counterbalance one 
another.26 However, linkages are not always feasible, in particular in the presence of ex 
ante uncertainty relating to distributional consequences of a prospective agreement. If 
states do not know who would win and who would lose under the agreement, their 
abilities to devise transfer payments are compromised. In addition, linkages can burden 
the negotiation agenda, unraveling compromises on issues which could successfully be 
negotiated in isolation.27  
 
While linkages within the WTO facilitate agreements that would not be feasible in 
the absence of the linkages, states always retain an incentive to defect on the package 
deals they have negotiated.28 The WTO can help states solidify issue linkages and reduce 
their incentives for defection. The WTO agreements are legally binding on all member 
states. If a WTO member violates its obligations, the WTO can authorize trade retaliation 
                                                 
22 R.D. Tollison & T.D. Willett, An economic theory of mutually advantageous issue linkages in 
international organization, 33 INT’L ORG. 425, 430-37 (1979). 
23 See id. See also James K. Sebenius, Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties, 
37 INT’L ORG. 281, 300 (1983). Linkage represents an effective way of overcoming a distributional conflict 
when direct transfer payments are not feasible.  
24 Christina Davis, International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade 
Liberalization, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 153, 164 (2004). Contrary to several studies contending that 
economic interests, market power or lobbying activities explain when trade liberalization occurs, Davis 
shows that institutional cross-issue linkages are more relevant in determining trade patterns. Issue linkage 
has forged an agreement when powerful lobby groups have opposed cooperation. Linkage alters the interest 
group dynamics by mobilizing coalitions to counter parochial pressures. Thus, “liberalization will be most 
likely when the linkage successfully counters the collective action problems and institutional biases at the 
domestic level that favor protection.” 
25 Id. at 158. 
26 Id. at 153.  
27 Sebenius, supra note 23, at 300. 
28 As long as states are able to enhance their individual payoff by defecting from the linkage equilibrium, 
the temptation to defect from agreed transfer payments exists.  
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measures and hold states accountable through the DSM.29 The enforceability of WTO 
agreements challenges the common view that international law is always “soft” and 
compliance with it, voluntary. Thus, the WTO serves two related purposes: it facilitates 
the formation of linkages at the treaty-making stage and helps to sustain these linkages by 
raising the costs of defection at the compliance stage.  
 
The need for enforcement is more germane in some areas of international 
cooperation than in others. When states choose between binding, enforceable agreements 
and non-binding agreements with no enforcement provisions, the key causal variable is 
the risk of opportunism.30 Binding international agreements with cautiously negotiated 
commitments are less susceptible to self-serving interpretation by states.31 Such 
agreements also deter cheating by raising the cost of non-compliance.32 Thus, binding 
agreements are particularly advantageous in Prisoners Dilemma (“PD”) situations where 
the potential for costly opportunism is high and cheating is difficult to detect.33 In 
contrast, when the incentives to defect from the agreed commitments are low, a binding 
agreement with enforceable commitments is less valuable. This is the case predominantly 
in coordination games (“CG”) where the parties generally lack the incentives to deviate 
from the agreement once the focal point of coordination has been established.34   
 
Accordingly, if the cooperation problem that states face resembles a PD (which 
acknowledges an intrinsic incentive for the players to cheat), states are more likely to 
negotiate a binding agreement with enforcement provisions. In contrast, if the 
cooperation problem resembles a CG (where agreements are largely self-enforcing), 
enforcement provisions are redundant and thus often not included. Barbara Koremenos’s 
recent empirical study on international agreements with dispute settlement provisions 
supports this argument. Koremenos finds that approximately half of all international 
agreements among states include dispute settlement provisions. She also found that states 
include dispute settlement provisions only when they are likely to be needed. In other 
words, the inclusion of the dispute settlement provision correlates positively with the 
likelihood of non-compliance or “the strength of individual actors’ incentives to cheat.”35 
It follows that the likelihood of states negotiating agreements within the WTO should 
also positively correlate with the likelihood of the states’ incentives to behave 
opportunistically.  
                                                 
29 Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 
YALE J. INT’L L. 335, 358-59 (1989). 
30 Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 593-94 (2005).  
31 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 
421, 426–27 (2000) (hereinafter Abbott & Snidal, Hard and Soft Law). 
32 The costs of reneging can manifest themselves both in the form of reputational costs or actual sanctions. 
See id. at 427. 
33 Id. at 429. 
34 Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 30, at 592-94. See also Abbott, supra note 29, at 358-59, 363-
74. While the possibility of defection is not entirely absent in coordination situations, any surreptitious 
cheating, at least, is unlikely. See Lisa L. Martin, The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism, in 
MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND PRAXIS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FORM 91, 102 (John Gerard 
Ruggie ed., Columbia 1993). 
35 Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, 
Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 192, 209 (2007).  
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Finally, states’ choice of venue for negotiating international agreements reflects 
their perception of which institution allows them to obtain the best possible outcome at 
the lowest cost.36 In addition to the WTO’s key advantages—linkages and enforcement 
mechanism—states’ willingness to pursue an agreement in the WTO turns on the 
availability of alternatives they have outside the WTO. The higher the opportunity costs 
of non-agreement in the WTO are, the more persistent states’ efforts to include the issue 
in the WTO will be. In contrast, the more content the states are with the status quo or the 
more non-WTO alternatives they have, the lower the costs of forgoing the WTO 
negotiations are. Thus, the likelihood of the WTO agreement is often not only a function 
of costs and benefits of the WTO agreement, but also a function of the opportunity costs 
of a non-WTO agreement.37 
  
II. Testing the Limits of the WTO: Explaining the Divergent Outcomes in the 
IPR and Antitrust Cooperation 
 
States’ pursuit of international IPR and antitrust cooperation under the auspices of 
the WTO forms part of a broader goal to institutionalize deregulation and trade 
liberalization globally and to further expand the liberalization trend to the sphere of 
domestic regulation. Following significant gains in reducing tariff barriers on goods and 
services, the focus of trade talks has moved from the removal of conventional trade 
barriers to identifying and addressing new trade barriers that states erect to protect their 
domestic markets. For instance, states are projected to employ lax or strategic antitrust 
laws or offer inadequate protection of IPRs to hinder the free flow of goods and services 
into their markets.38 Fears of new forms of protectionism have reinforced demands to 
expand the scope of the WTO to include rules on IPRs and antitrust, among other areas, 
to preserve the economic benefits of free trade.39 
IPRs were successfully brought under the auspices of the WTO in 1994 when the 
TRIPs Agreement was adopted as a part of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round. The 
Agreement established a global IPR regime with provisions to protect and enforce 
                                                 
36 Davis, supra note 24, at 4. 
37 See, e.g., David Lax & James Sebenius, The Power of Alternatives or the Limits to Negotiation, in 
NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 97-114 (J. William Breslin & Jeffery Z. Rubin eds., Program on 
Negotiation at Harvard Law School 1991). 
38 See Andrew T. Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: 
ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 99, 101, 108-09 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. 
Greve eds., AEI Press 2004). 
39 The growing trend to broaden the WTO’s negotiation agenda can also be explained by the WTO’s 
successful historical track record in embracing a variety of more or less trade-related areas. The undeniable 
substantive links that trade policy has with other policy domains has further contributed to the perception 
that the WTO is a natural forum to pursue regulatory reforms in any area of economy. In addition, the 
WTO has been a particularly attractive forum for pursuing further trade liberalization due to the broad 
membership and the enforcement mechanism that the institution offers. Various interest groups demanding 
greater global regulation therefore often consider WTO to be the most effective forum for them to advance 
their goals. The WTO’s perceived effectiveness has further reinforced path dependency and regime 
persistence. See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, International institutions: Two approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q. 
379, 389 (1988); Jose E. Alvarez, Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO: The WTO as Linkage 
Machine, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 146-47 (2002). 
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patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets. The TRIPs Agreement provides for 
minimum standards that all WTO members are bound by, coupled with a system to 
enforce those standards internationally. The initiative for the Agreement came from a 
small group of powerful U.S. corporations whose activities depend on strong IP 
protection. They mobilized the support of their counterparts in the EU and Japan. The 
United States, EU, and Japanese corporations subsequently lobbied their respective 
governments and ensured that their IP agenda remained a negotiating priority for the key 
states.  
 
Initially, developed countries pushing for the agreement faced strong resistance 
from developing countries including India, Brazil and Korea. After eight years of trade 
talks, however, the TRIPs Agreement emerged as a part of a “grand bargain” consisting 
of multiple trade deals all incorporated in the Final Act of the newly established WTO. 
The TRIPs Agreement was the result of collaboration among some of the most powerful 
multinational corporations (“MNCs”) and some of the most powerful states in the global 
trading system. As the discussion below explains, the developing country resistance to 
the Agreement was suppressed with a mix of persuasion, pressure, threats, linkages, and 
other bargaining tactics.  
 
For those who advocate expanding the scope of the WTO, TRIPs is used as an 
important precedent showing that the WTO can accommodate new issues that fall outside 
of the traditional non-discrimination regime and encroach into the realm of domestic 
regulation. The TRIPs Agreement imposes positive obligations on states to undertake 
regulatory reforms, going well beyond the scope of issues traditionally addressed in the 
WTO. The TRIPs is also an oft-cited precedent for those who argue that the WTO is best 
suited to address issues with distributional consequences that create winners and losers. 
For instance, while developing countries would have been unlikely to sign onto a 
standalone agreement on IPRs, they conceded in the WTO framework where TRIPs was 
a part of broader package that ensured gains to each WTO member.  
 
The success of the TRIPs Agreement has fostered a perception that antitrust 
commitments ought to be feasible to negotiate in the WTO as well. Andrew Guzman, for 
instance, claims that “a very similar strategic relationship among countries existed in IP 
until an agreement was reached during the Uruguay Round GATT/WTO talks. The IP 
case study offers a valuable lesson about how competition [antitrust] negotiations ought 
to proceed”.40 However, as the recent history of WTO negotiations show, the efforts to 
negotiate an antitrust agreement under the auspices of the WTO have failed and 
cooperation has followed a very different path.  
 
States have pursued antitrust cooperation since the adoption of Havana Charter in 
1948.41 The EU, with the support of Canada and Japan, has been the primary proponent 
of the WTO antitrust agreement. The United States has consistently resisted attempts to 
                                                 
40 Guzman, supra note 6, at 974. 
41 See, e.g., Nataliya Yacheistova, The International Competition Regulation – A Short Review of a Long 
Evolution, 18 WORLD COMPETITION, LAW AND ECON. 99, 99–110, (1994). See also MARSDEN, supra note 2, 
at ch. 1. 
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incorporate antitrust in the trade regime. In 1996, at the request of the EU, the WTO 
Ministerial Conference established a Working Group on Competition. The task of the 
Working Group was to examine the linkages between trade and antitrust issues and 
identify issues that the WTO should potentially address in this regard. In 2001, antitrust 
was included on the agenda of the Doha Round.42 At the 2003 Cancun Ministerial 
meeting, however, the WTO negotiations on antitrust were stalled due to the resistance of 
the developing countries. Following the collapse of the negotiations in Cancun, the WTO 
General Council decided to officially drop antitrust policy from the Doha Round 
negotiation agenda on August 1, 2004.43 There is little to suggest that WTO antitrust 
negotiations will be revived anytime soon.  
 
This Section explains why the TRIPs Agreement was successful, why antitrust 
negotiations were a failure, and why exactly the outcome of the two sets of issues was so 
different.44 It first discusses the general preconditions for successful cooperation—the 
great power consensus and the support of influential interest groups—and shows how 
these attributes were present in the case of the TRIPs negotiations but were missing in the 
case of antitrust negotiations. While the presence of these conditions in the case of TRIPs 
is generally recognized, the broad literature advocating a WTO international antitrust 
agreement has been surprisingly ignorant of the absence of coherent great power and 
interest group support, cultivating unfounded optimism about the prospect of harnessing 
the necessary political backing for the WTO antitrust agreement. The below discussion 
seeks to explain why no coherent interest group coalition has emerged to support a WTO 
antitrust agreement and—maybe even more surprisingly—why powerful states have 
repeatedly put antitrust on the WTO’s negotiation agenda even when none of the 
influential interest groups have urged them to do so.  
 
The discussion then moves on to examine the WTO-specific preconditions for 
successful cooperation in the two areas. It argues that the gains and losses that the TRIPs 
Agreement was going to produce were relatively unambiguous prior to the conclusion of 
the Agreement, enabling states to design issue linkages that compensated developing 
countries that expected to lose from the Agreement. In contrast, antitrust negotiations 
have been impeded by substantial uncertainty regarding the prospective winners and 
                                                 
42 Antitrust was one of the so-called “Singapore issues,” together with investment, trade facilitation, and 
transparency in government procurement, that were placed on a conditional negotiation track. Being on a 
conditional negotiation track made it subject to an explicit decision on the scope and timeframe at the 2003 
Cancun Ministerial Conference.  
43 See Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, supra note 2. 
44 This Article highlights five primary reasons that explain the success of the TRIPs Agreement and the 
failure to conclude an antitrust agreement. There are, however, other explanations for why the TRIPs 
Agreement was successful. For instance, the political and ideological climate was particularly favorable to 
the TRIPs Agreement at the time the negotiations were launched. The neo-classical economic liberalism 
dominated the thinking of the international community and the major international institutions in 1980s. 
Ronald Reagan’s United States and Margaret Thatcher’s United Kingdom embraced a free-market agenda 
that sought to institutionalize deregulation and trade liberalization globally. The GATT Secretariat 
endorsed the liberal trade order and sought to regain its relevance in the eyes of the developed countries, 
which had begun to bypass the GATT in their economic policymaking after the GATT became preoccupied 
with the developing country concerns in early 1980s.) This led the GATT Secretariat to endorse the 
developed country agenda, including the TRIPs Agreement. See Sell, supra note 8, at 20. 
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losers under the Agreement, obstructing states’ ability to form issue-linkages. Thus, the 
existing literature has overestimated the WTO’s ability to resort to linkages, overlooking 
that the linkage strategy is contingent on the states’ ability to predict the distributional 
consequences of the agreement.  
 
The below discussion also asserts that defection from a prospective agreement 
was a concern underlying the TRIPs negotiations whereas the likelihood of cheating and 
hence the need for WTO’s enforcement mechanism is a lesser concern in antitrust 
negotiations. This claim challenges the prevailing presumption that antitrust cooperation 
would also be impeded by incentives to defect from commitments. Finally, the net gains 
from the TRIPs Agreement to its proponents were much higher and more certain than the 
prospective gains for any state supporting a WTO antitrust agreement. Similarly, the 
opportunity costs of not cooperating with respect to IPRs in the WTO were significantly 
higher than they were in the case of antitrust where various alternatives for pursuing 
regulatory convergence existed.  
 
A. The Power-Politics Explanation: Does the “Great Power Consensus” Exist?  
 
A consensus among great powers regarding the necessity and the content of the 
TRIPs Agreement was a defining factor that led to the successful conclusion of the 
agreement. In contrast, an accord among great powers was missing in the antitrust 
negotiations, contributing to the breakdown of the negotiations.  
 
1. The Great Power Consensus on the TRIPs Agreement  
 
The great powers are also the leading producers of IP products.45 As unambiguous 
beneficiaries of stronger IP protection, they were ardent advocates of the TRIPs 
Agreement and pursued their goal as a unified front.46 Stronger international IP 
protection was known to reinforce their IP exporters’ position by enabling them to charge 
supra-competitive prices of their products abroad. Thus, the TRIPs Agreement was 
guaranteed to improve the terms of trade and the national income of the great powers.47  
                                                 
45 The benefits of IP protection are highly concentrated in a few economically powerful developed 
countries. According to WIPO, in 2000 the nationals of developed countries owned ninety-three percent of 
all patents granted to foreigners. Five countries (the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom 
and Switzerland) owned seventy-six percent of them, the United States’ share being twenty-six percent. 
The United States is the primary beneficiary of IP-related trade. Its net income from IP–related trade 
increased from $1.1 billion in 1970 to $14.3 billion in 2001. The pharmaceutical industry is illustrative of 
how concentrated the benefits from the TRIPs Agreement were going to be: ninety percent of new 
pharmaceutical products originate from the United States, EU or Japan. The three powers also host over 
two-thirds of the total world production of pharmaceuticals and account for over ninety percent of the R&D 
expenditure in the field. See Meir Perez Pugatch, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 51, 54 (Edward Elgar 2004). 
46 See, e.g., A. O. Adede, The Political Economy of the TRIPs Agreement: Origins and History of 
Negotiations 4, 12 (July 30, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Eastern and Southern Africa 
Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on Trade, Intellectual Property and Biological Resources, Nairobi, Kenya).  
47 Pugatch, supra note 45, at 49. While some substantive disagreements among the great powers existed, 
the magnitude of absolute gains available from the TRIPs Agreement superseded any concerns the great 
powers harbored about relative gains under the final agreement.  
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Since the great powers all supported the TRIPs Agreement, the only true battle 
was to persuade the developing countries to sign onto the agreement. Developing 
countries had little to gain from the TRIPs Agreement: they are primarily consumers and 
copiers of IP-related products. While developed countries argued that the TRIPs 
Agreement would benefit developing countries by stimulating innovation and attracting 
foreign direct investment, developing countries found such benefits weak, distant, and 
uncertain.48 In addition, given the extent of the domestic opposition of the Agreement, 
developing countries knew that signing onto the TRIPs was politically costly. Hence, the 
TRIPs Agreement seemed to offer no Pareto-gains for developing countries.  
 
If developing countries knew that the TRIPs Agreement was going to reduce their 
economic welfare, why did they sign into it? In the WTO, all states have equal voting 
rights and the decisions are reached based on the consensus principle. These institutional 
safeguards ought to ensure that the great powers cannot impose undesirable agreements 
on developing countries. However, a closer examination of the dynamics of the WTO 
negotiations reveals that the formal equality of the states often yields to power based 
bargaining in practice.  
 
Developing countries refrained from using their veto right for two primary 
reasons. First, developing countries already faced trade retaliation from the great powers, 
which resorted to coercive tactics in their bilateral relations with them. Prior to TRIPs, 
the United States relied primarily on two instruments in pressuring developing countries 
to adopt stronger domestic IP laws: first, the denial or withdrawal of the GSP benefits, 
which enables certain countries to enjoy preferential treatment (such as lower tariffs) in 
their trade relations with the United States; and second, the employment of Section 301 
of the 1974 Trade Act, which enables the United States to impose unilateral trade 
sanctions against countries that engage in “unfair competition”.49 Thus, developing 
countries were confronted with the choice of enduring continuing unilateral trade 
retaliation from the United States (and to a lesser degree from the EU) or accepting a 
multilateral IP regime where the United States’ ability to unilaterally retaliate against 
them would be constrained by the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism.  
 
Second, developing countries had no choice but to accept the TRIPs Agreement 
because of a “single undertaking” approach that the great powers successfully pursued to 
close the Uruguay Round.50 In contrast to the previous trade negotiation rounds, which 
had allowed states to opt out of trade agreements that they did not want to be bound by, 
the single undertaking approach meant that the acceptance of the entire set of the 
                                                 
48 Id. at 55 (citing Arvind Subramanian, Putting Some Numbers on the TRIPs Pharmaceutical Debate, 10 
INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 252, 252-53 (1995)). Several studies supported this perception. Subramanian, for 
instance, has calculated that annual welfare loss from grant of patents would amount to $100-$400 million 
in Argentina and $341 million to $1.26 billion in India. 
49 On several occasions, the United States issued specific threats—at times carrying out such threats—by 
coercing developing countries to agree to a higher level of IP protection. See Pugatch, supra note 45, at 67, 
72 (noting the United States’ successful attempts to coerce Korea and Brazil). See also United States Tariff 
Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).   
50 Steinberg, supra note 7, at 360. 
16 
 
Uruguay Round agreements—including the TRIPs Agreement—was a precondition for 
any benefits negotiated in the GATT as well as the membership in the newly established 
WTO.51 To compel all states to accept the Final Act of the Uruguay Round and join the 
WTO, the United States and the EU withdrew from their 1947 GATT obligations and 
terminated their trade obligations vis-à-vis states that did not accept the Final Act. By 
doing this, the two trade powers presented developing countries with a new choice set 
from which the status quo was removed. Developing countries had to decide whether to 
sign the TRIPs Agreement or forgo all the benefits they had negotiated in the previous 
fifty years. Developing countries, obviously, could not afford to choose the latter.52  
 
The history of the TRIPs negotiations exposes the role that power plays in 
negotiations that are formally guided by the principle of equal rights and consensus 
among all states. That the great powers acted jointly in pursuit of a commonly defined 
goal paved the way for the TRIPs Agreement and allowed them to overcome the 
developing countries’ initial resistance. The tactics they used might not have amounted to 
overt coercion. However, by changing the opportunity set available for developing 
countries, developed countries effectively left developing countries with little choice but 
to sign onto the agreement that was not Pareto-improving to them. Great powers are still 
able to dictate the negotiation agenda, the bargaining process, and the final outcome, 
challenging the institutionalist paradigm that assumes that international institutions are 
Pareto-improving and facilitate mutual gains for all states.53  
   
                                                 
51 GATT refers to the “General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade” which was concluded in 1947. It is a 
predesessor of the WTO. Today, the WTO provides a treaty framework for various agreements, including 
GATT.  
52 Id. The United States and European Union’s exit strategy resembles Lloyd Gruber’s theory of “go-it-
alone” power. Gruber contests the positive-sum models of international cooperation and explains why 
states join institutions that are not Pareto-improving for them. He argues that states that stand to lose from 
cooperative arrangements know that winners often can proceed without them. Thus, the winners can “go-it-
alone” and the new arrangement will materialize irrespective of the losing states’ support, changing the 
institutional landscape in which the losing states operate. This changes the losing states’ interest calculation 
and causes them to join the new institution even though they would have preferred that such an institution 
never materialized in the first place. Thus, while the TRIPs Agreement did not offer any Pareto-gains for 
developing countries, it was strategically better for developing countries to join the WTO which 
incorporated the TRIPs Agreement than for them to give up all their hard-earned trade benefits. See 
generally LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD: POWER POLITICS AND THE RISE OF SUPRANATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS (2000). 
53 Id. at 704. Daniel Drezner, Globalization, Harmonization, and Competition: The Different Pathways to 
Policy Convergence, 12 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 841 (2005). Pugatch, supra note 45, at 228. 
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2. The Great Power Divide on International Antitrust Cooperation 
 
In contrast to the great power consensus over the international IP regime, one of 
the primary obstacles to a binding international antitrust agreement has been a 
longstanding disagreement between the United States and the EU regarding the content 
and institutional form of the international antitrust cooperation. The United States has 
repeatedly stated its opposition to the WTO antitrust rules, while the EU has been their 
strongest advocate.54  
 
The United States and EU positions on how to protect IPRs are more closely 
aligned than their views on how to protect their markets from anti-competitive practices. 
Even as the United States and EU antitrust laws are gradually converging, disagreement 
on the optimal content of antitrust laws remains. This disagreement stems from a 
different belief on when and how a government should intervene when markets fail. In 
general, the EU is considered to be more interventionist and less tolerant of market 
power. Consequently, the EU is more likely to challenge mergers and pursue the conduct 
of a dominant corporation. The divergent outcomes in the Microsoft dominance case and 
the GE/Honeywell merger case are often cited as most prominent examples of the 
remaining transatlantic differences.55  
 
The U.S.-EU divergence has obstructed states’ abilities to negotiate antitrust 
matters in the WTO. The initial proposal to incorporate antitrust in the WTO originated 
from the EU, which has remained the agreement’s vocal proponent. The United States, in 
contrast, has systematically opposed any WTO antitrust agreement and supported 
bilateral cooperation agreements and voluntary multilateral cooperation within the 
International Competition Network (“ICN”), a voluntary network among worlds’ antitrust 
agencies, instead.56 The EU’s support for formal WTO negotiations stems from a variety 
                                                 
54 See, e.g., Douglas Melamed, Antitrust Enforcement in a Global Economy, Address at the Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute 25th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct. 22, 
1998); Mario Monti, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, A Global Competition Policy?, 
Address at the European Competition Day Conference (Sept. 17, 2002). 
55 On Microsoft, see, e.g., Commission Decision, Microsoft, COMP/C-3/37.792, 2004 O.J. (C 290), 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf (imposing a fine 
after concluding that Microsoft had abused its dominant position in violation of Art. 82 EC); United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, Memorandum Opinion with Findings of Fact and Final 
Judgment of November 1, 2002, In re State of New York et al. v. Microsoft Corporation, Civil Action No. 
98-1233 (CKK); United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Memorandum Opinion with 
Findings of Fact and Final Judgment of November 1, 2002, In re United States of America v. Microsoft 
Corporation, Civil Action No. 98-1233 (CKK) (endorsing the settlement between the United States and 
Microsoft). On GE/Honeywell, see Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Justice Department Requires 
Divestitures in Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8140.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2010); Commission 
Decision of 3 July 2001, General Electric/Honeywell, Case COMP/M.2220. 
56 See U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., INT'L COMPETITION ADVISORY COMM. TO THE ATT'Y GENERAL 
AND ASSISTANT ATT'Y GENERAL FOR ANTITRUST, FINAL REPORT 33 (2000) [hereinafter ICPAC Report], 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2010); William J. Kolasky, 
Global Competition: Prospects for Convergence and Cooperation, Address at the American Bar 
Association Fall Forum (Nov. 7, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200446.htm 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2010). 
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of factors, including its preference for multilateral, institutionalized rulemaking over less 
predictable, case-by-case cooperation among regulators. The EU is also willing to link 
antitrust more closely to trade policy, whereas the United States wants to keep the two 
issues separate. In addition, as more WTO members are moving towards adopting EU-
style (as opposed to U.S.-style) antitrust laws, the EU perceives the antitrust cooperation 
within the WTO as an opportunity to institutionalize its own preferred regulatory regime 
internationally.  
 
International cooperation is more likely to fail when great powers are divided. 
However, antitrust negotiations were not obstructed only because of the United States 
opposition: at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial meeting, the negotiations were blocked by the 
coalition of developing countries. While developing countries would arguably have been 
the greatest beneficiaries of the international antitrust agreement, the regulatory burden 
and resulting compliance costs turned developing countries against the agreement. 
Without adequate resources or legal and economic expertise to enforce antitrust laws, the 
developing countries concluded that they were not ready to negotiate the WTO antitrust 
agreement.57  
 
The Cancun failure shows that developing countries can sometimes successfully 
offset some of the great powers’ bargaining advantage by forming coalitions that veto 
specific proposals and thereby compromise the leverage that the great powers have over 
outcomes.58 Resource pooling helps weaker states gain more diplomatic clout, since their 
combined market size translates directly into more bargaining power.59 In particular, 
when the interests of the great powers are divided, developing countries can more 
effectively counter the pressure that a fragmented great power coalition exercises. 
 
In the ongoing Doha Round, the United States and the EU have been unable to 
dominate the negotiations. They have often found themselves in opposing alliances.60 
When the United States and the EU have not acted in concert, developing countries have 
taken advantage of the great power divide and obstructed the negotiations, despite the 
                                                 
57 Developing countries also expected to incur political costs from the agreement, since import-competing 
industries or former state monopolies were likely to resist strict antitrust laws removing their existing 
government protection. Developing countries also failed to see the agreement on antitrust as a development 
priority in light of more pressing socio-economic problems that would need to be addressed. See also 
Editorial, The Real Lesson of the Cancun Failure, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 23, 2003, at 16. 
58 The “G20,” a coalition of developing countries (not to be confused with the G20 that refers to the Group 
of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors), was a major force in blocking the antitrust 
negotiations in Cancun. Developing counties have also kept off the table issues including labor rights, 
demanded by the United States, and environmental issues, endorsed by the European Union. Developing 
countries also prevailed in demanding for a declaration on TRIPs and public health despite strong 
objections of the United States.  
59 Manfred Elsig, Different Facets of Power in Decision-Making in the WTO 25-28 (Sept. 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090146>). Reliance on coalitions also 
mitigate the information gap and deficient resources. However, the larger the coalitions are, the less 
cohesive and thereby less effective they become. (For example, African states and other developing 
countries do not always have shared interests on issues regarding South-South trade.) The relative influence 
and ability to extract commitments diminishes as compromises need to be negotiated within the coalition.  
60 Id.  
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significant opportunity costs that the failure of the Doha Round—antitrust agreement 
included—presents to them. Ironically, it seems that the power divide in antitrust has 
prevented states from signing an agreement that could be Pareto-improving to all.61  
 
 
B. The Political Economy Explanation: Do Strong Domestic Interest Groups 
Support the International Agreement? 
 
The TRIPs Agreement emerged following an unprecedented interest group 
pressure as influential MNCs promoted the inclusion of the IPRs into the WTO agenda.62 
In contrast, few corporations, industry organizations or consumer groups have actively 
endorsed a WTO antitrust agreement. Instead, the demand for international antitrust rules 
has stemmed from a small number of prominent antitrust agencies while individual 
corporations have focused their lobbying efforts on domestic antitrust agencies in cases 
where their interests have been directly and individually at stake.63  
 
1. The Interest Groups’ Quest for the TRIPs Agreement 
 
The TRIPs Agreement was going to improve the terms of trade for the great 
powers that were and continue to be the major exporters of IP products. In addition, 
within those countries, those gains were going to be captured by a distinctly defined 
group of producers whose commercial success relies on vigorous IP protection. These 
producers became the primary norm entrepreneurs of the TRIPs Agreement. They formed 
a transnational coalition and engaged in an unprecedented lobbying effort to establish a 
global IP regime.64  
 
The support of powerful MNCs does not, as such, guarantee that those private 
interests are translated into government policies and ultimately into public international 
law. While private interests prevailed in the TRIPs negotiations, the triumph of the 
MNCs in devising the global trade order has not stretched across all issue areas. The 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) and the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (“TRIMS”), for instance, which were supported by many of the 
same interests groups and which took place at the same time with the TRIPs negotiations 
                                                 
61 Accordingly, power politics interferes with the notion of Pareto-optimality by causing some Pareto-
improving agreements to fail (antitrust) and causing some agreements to materialize that fail to deliver 
gains to all (TRIPs). 
62 See Sylvia Ostry, Convergence and Sovereignty: Policy Scope for Compromise?, in COPING WITH 
GLOBALIZATION 52, 55-57 (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A. Hart eds., Routledge 2000). 
63 See, e.g., COMMENTS BY INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND BUSINESS & INDUSTRY 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE OECD ON THE REPORT OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE 2, 6, 10 (June 5, 2000), available at < 
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/competition/Statements/ICC_BIAC_Comments_Intl%20
ComityAMC.pdf > (last visited Mar. 2, 2010). 
64 The efforts to create a global IP regime were led by the Intellectual Property Committee (“IPC”), an ad 
hoc interest group consisting of twelve chief executives representing pharmaceutical, movie and software 
industries. The IPC reached out to their counterparts in Europe and Japan to mobilize a transnational 
coalition to pressure for the agreement (most notably, note UNICE in the EU and Keidanan in Japan).   
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in the same institutional framework fell short of the demands of the private sector.65  
Accordingly, it appears that the TRIPs Agreement was a product of a distinct set of 
circumstances that made the Agreement particularly susceptible for a high level of 
lobbying activity.   
 
Interest groups assumed a prominent role in the TRIPs talks because of 
particularly high benefits that they expected to receive from their lobbying activity. The 
pharmaceutical industry, for instance, is highly dependent on effective patent protection. 
According to some estimates, average costs for developing a new drug are $500–$800 
million. Only three out of ten marketable drugs produce profits that exceed the average 
costs of their research and development. It is also estimated that 60–65 percent of drugs 
would have never been developed in the absence of IP protection.66 Thus, the high stakes 
involved in securing enhanced IP protection increased the expected utility available from 
the lobbying activity. 
 
Second, the lobbying was particularly attractive since the benefits were to fall on 
a small and coherent interest group.67  Lobby groups are most effective when they have 
homogeneous interests.68 Corporations supporting the TRIPs Agreement came from 
highly concentrated business sectors, allowing them to construct a unified cross-industry 
position.69 The limited number of members and a clear sectoral definition of the industry 
lobby diminished the danger of conflicting interests and kept the lobbying coalition 
cohesive in its mission and in the strategies pursued.70 The need to secure global IP 
protection provided a powerful common denominator for the industry and a solid basis 
for cooperation. The joint gains available to the industry from the TRIPs Agreement 
superseded any relative gains that the corporations were hoping to secure as each other’s 
competitors.71  
                                                 
65 Sell, supra note 8, at 4. The private interests supporting the GATS Agreement, for instance, consisted of 
a more diverse group of corporate actors including representatives of banking industry, legal services, and 
travel industry. Thus, overcoming collective action problems was more challenging in the presence of a 
more heterogeneous interest group. See id. at 172.  
66 Pugatch, supra note 45, at 89. 
67 The small membership of the lobbying coalition also ensured that the per-person stakes were going to be 
higher. Small membership in a lobbying group increases the probability that any single member of the 
coalition can affect the outcome. Lobbying was also successful because of the technological know-how 
advantage the coalition possessed over the government negotiators regarding the IP agenda. Pharmaceutical 
MNCs and other IP-driven corporations exploited this informational advantage by lending their expertise to 
the governments. The framing skills of the lobbying coalition also increased their prospects of successfully 
influencing the governments’ negotiations positions. The IPC, for instance, framed the issue to the U.S. 
government as a “trade problem” as much as an “IP problem”. The U.S. government was particularly 
responsive to IPC’s IP agenda when it was presented as crucial for the United States’ competitiveness and a 
solution for the United States’ increasing trade deficit. Sell, supra note 8, at 2. 
68 The members of the TRIPs coalition also had much to gain from pooling their resources when engaging 
in their costly lobbying activities and incurring costs such as costs of organizing a coalition, collecting and 
disseminating information, preparing policy briefs and presenting them to the government negotiators. 
GENE M. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS 143 (2001).  
69Pugatch, supra note 45, at 93, 115. The pharmaceutical industry, for instance, consists of thirty to fifty 
MNCs producing approximately two-thirds of world pharmaceutical output.  
70 Id. at 3. 
71 Id. at 5-6.  
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Finally, the costs of collective action, which can at times undermine interest 
groups’ ability to pursue their interests, never became a major obstacle for the TRIPs 
lobby. The TRIPs lobby consisted of a particularly resourceful group of corporations that 
were able to sustain high lobbying costs since the industry benefits from high marginal 
profits. Also, the prospect of free riding, which is one of the primary costs of collective 
action for interest groups, was diminished because the interest group was small, coherent, 
and sectorally defined.72 Such a homogeneous group with limited membership is better 
able to mitigate collective action problems involved in lobbying, reducing the costs, 
increasing the utility, and thus enhancing the overall attractiveness of lobbying.  
 
The effectiveness of the TRIPs lobby and, consequently, the extent of political 
rents available from the TRIPs Agreement provided the governments of the most 
powerful trading nations an apparent domestic political economy rationale for the 
Agreement.73 In the end, the transnational coalition lobbying for the TRIPs Agreement 
was successful beyond its initial goals. The comprehensiveness of the TRIPs Agreement 
superseded even the initial expectations of the MNCs supporting the Agreement, setting 
the TRIPs lobby apart from most other instances where private corporations have been 
actively lobbying for international regimes.  
 
Consequently, the emergence of the TRIPs Agreement can be explained as a 
manifestation of some of the world’s most powerful corporations acting in concert with 
the world’s most powerful economies.74 The views presented by the leading powers in 
the WTO mirrored closely the views advanced by their domestic industries.75 The 
governments became agents of the domestic IPR lobby, which not only devised the 
global IPR agenda and developed a strategy to realize it, but also steered governments 
through the negotiation process toward an outcome that closely aligned with the interests 
of the IP-industry. 
 
                                                 
72 Some risk of free-riding persists, as a corporation may always elect not to participate in the lobbying 
knowing that it would still reap benefits of a successful TRIPs Agreement that the lobbying coalition would 
secure (IP protection would be akin to a non-excludable and non-rival public good whereby one member 
cannot reasonably prevent another from consuming the good and where one member’s consumption of the 
good does not affect that of another). 
73 This was also true given that the counter-lobby opposing the TRIPs Agreement consisted of a much less 
organized and considerably less resourceful set of corporations that are copying or consuming IP-related 
products, including manufacturers of generic pharmaceuticals. 
74 Sell, supra note 8, at 3. 
75 Pugatch, supra note 45, at 173. EU Commission, for instance, explicitly acknowledged that its pursuit of 
a global IP regime stems from the interests of the European IP industry. See id. (The commission has 
argued that its “prolific activity is due to the need, clearly felt nowadays, to provide European firms doing 
business in non-Community countries with an adequate legal framework within which to enjoy effective 
genuine protection of know-how and innovation.”). 
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2. The Agency-Driven Pursuit of International Antitrust Rules 
 
In contrast to the TRIPs negotiations, private interests have been largely absent 
from the quest for WTO antitrust rules. Few corporations, industry organizations, or 
consumer groups have endorsed the agreement.76 The international antitrust regime does 
not seem to have a clear constituency that would unequivocally benefit from the WTO 
antitrust rules and therefore, there is no equivalent stakeholder to assume the role played 
by the IP industry in its pursuit for the TRIPs Agreement. In the absence of strong 
domestic interest group support, governments have not invested their political capital in 
negotiating an agreement that would confer limited, if any, political rents to them. 
 
As a constituency, consumers seem to be the only group that would benefit from 
antitrust action in most, if not all cases. This is because antitrust laws in most 
jurisdictions are enacted to maximize consumer welfare. However, consumers as 
beneficiaries of antitrust regulation form a fragmented interest group. Consumer 
organizations representing the interests of individual consumers have also assumed a 
passive role in the debate on international antitrust rules, focusing their lobbying 
activities on less “technocratic” areas of cooperation instead.77  
 
What explains then the relative passiveness of corporations in the antitrust 
domain? The stakes in international antitrust cases would seem high. The costs involved 
in EU Commission’s prohibition of the proposed GE/Honeywell merger between two 
U.S. corporations, for instance, were extremely high, as have been the litigation costs and 
remedies Microsoft has faced in Europe even when the U.S. antitrust agencies have 
cleared these corporations’ transactions and conduct as pro-competitive. Negotiating an 
international agreement to mitigate the costs associated with inconsistent domestic 
antitrust laws would thus be expected to confer high benefits for at least some powerful 
corporations that seek consolidation or frequently face investigations by multiple antitrust 
agencies. However, no coherent coalition has emerged to support a WTO antitrust 
agreement.78 
 
The inactivity of interest groups in the antitrust domain can be explained by the 
diffuse, case-specific, and often unpredictable nature of the costs and the benefits that a 
WTO antitrust agreement would confer. For instance, vigorous antitrust enforcement is 
                                                 
76 See, e.g., Comments by ICC and BIAC on the Report of the U.S. ICPAC, supra note 63 (while ICC and 
BIAC support some degree of substantive and some procedural harmonization and convergence of 
domestic merger regimes, “ICC and BIAC agree that the WTO is not an appropriate forum for review of 
private restraints and that the WTO should not develop new competition laws under its framework at this 
time”). 
77 See Raustiala, supra note 30, at 600. Raustiala argues that interest groups that favor international 
cooperation in a given issue generally support binding agreements because of their perceived effectiveness. 
Binding agreements also offer the domestic constituency more opportunities to influence their content as 
their conclusion generally requires more domestic legislative involvement. In contrast, informal 
cooperation mechanisms emerge in the areas of “technocratic cooperation”, including antitrust, where 
domestic interest groups are less active.  
78 Similarly, one may wonder why developing country corporations would not lobby for international 
antitrust rules that would more effectively discipline MNCs that conduct business on their domestic 
markets. 
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likely to be in the interest of a corporation, as long as the authorities across jurisdictions 
are targeting its competitors. However, when any given corporation itself becomes a 
target of an antitrust investigation, its position toward international antitrust cooperation 
is likely to reverse.79 This leads most corporations to be of two minds about increased 
international antitrust regulation, depending on which side of the dispute they stand in 
each individual case.80 Thus, the benefit that any all-encompassing WTO antitrust 
agreement would confer is uncertain for a corporation contemplating political action. 
More specifically, the benefit would seem to vary from case to case, sometimes being 
even negative. When a corporation cannot determine ex ante whether and how much it 
would benefit from an agreement, it is less likely to engage in lobbying activity.  
 
From the point of view of interest groups, the key difference between the TRIPs 
and the antitrust negotiations is that in the case of antitrust, the costs and the benefits of 
cross-border antitrust disputes fall on a single firm, not on a single industry. Lobbying for 
or against antitrust regulation thus becomes a private good rather than a policy pursued 
by an entire industry.81 This leads to the absence of industry-wide coalitions and moves 
the lobbying activity to the sphere of domestic agencies’ investigations in individual 
cases.  
 
Accordingly, corporations are likely to choose case-by-case the issues and 
instances in which they want antitrust agencies to cooperate. They employ their political 
strength vis-à-vis antitrust authorities when their interests are directly at stake.82 This type 
of political action is rational given the higher expected utility available from lobbying in 
an individual case. When lobbying is considered a private good, there are no (or at most 
few) other firms engaged in political activity.83 While all the costs of political action fall 
                                                 
79 In general, while corporations tend to define their interests case-by-case, they are expected to be more 
supportive of cooperation in the case of merger reviews, as this would reduce transaction costs and 
uncertainty. In contrast, corporations are expected to often resist rules that facilitate cooperation in cartel 
cases in the fear of one day being the target of a cartel investigation. See ABA & INT’L BAR ASSOC., A TAX 
ON MERGERS?: SURVEYING THE TIME AND COSTS TO BUSINESS OF MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL MERGER 
REVIEWS 5 (June 2003) (hereinafter Multi-Jurisdictional Merger Survey) (noting that fifty-six percent of 
the businesses see scope for improving and harmonizing merger notification processes); see also 
Comments by ICC and BIAC on the Report of the U.S. ICPAC, supra note 63.  
80 Of course, a group of corporations that hold a dominant market position or even monopoly power can be 
assumed to know ex ante in most cases which side of the dispute they stand in an antitrust investigation. 
While Microsoft was, for instance, recently lobbying the EU Commission to block Google’s acquisition of 
Double Click and was hence advocating more stringent antitrust scrutiny, in most cases Microsoft knows 
that it would in general benefit from lenient antitrust laws. It could potentially find a common standing with 
other powerful corporations holding monopoly positions that would enable them to form a coalition that 
would lobby for an overall lenient global antitrust regime. However, this has not happened and the antitrust 
lobbying has remained centered in domestic agencies.  
81 Michael J. Gilligan, Lobbying as a Private Good in Intra-Industry Trade, 41 INTER. STUD. Q. 455 (1997). 
82 For instance, considerable lobbying against undesired mergers takes place in the European Union as 
corporations believe that the more aggressive enforcement practices of the European Union are more likely 
to lead to stricter antitrust scrutiny and greater receptiveness of their arguments. 
83 There are firms that might still benefit from a corporation lobbying an agency directly—there is some 
coalition formation when for instance a group of small IT corporations collectively lobbied the U.S. and 
EU antitrust agencies to bring a case against Microsoft.  
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on a single firm, there is less free riding that could add to the costs of collective action.84 
Also, the benefits of lobbying are likely to be higher. A corporation is better able to 
determine the extent of its benefits on a case-by-case basis and adjust the level of its 
optimal lobbying activity accordingly in each case.  The benefit from lobbying is also 
expected to be higher given that the likelihood of a single firm determining an outcome is 
greater in the absence of multiple, competing interests within a coalition. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, a single firm can accumulate all of the benefits when an 
agency decides in its favor.  
 
In the absence of interest groups supporting the WTO antitrust agreement, it 
remains unclear why there still have been attempts to negotiate international antitrust 
rules. It is puzzling that powerful countries place certain regulatory issues continuously 
on the WTO negotiation agenda even when the key domestic constituency does not 
demand the agreement and when the prospects of reaching an agreement are slim. 
Interestingly, while the norm entrepreneurs behind the TRIPs Agreement were MNCs, 
the driving forces behind the antitrust negotiations have been a few domestic antitrust 
agencies, supported by the broader trade community. Most prominently, the demand for 
WTO antitrust rules stems from the EU Commission and its antitrust enforcers. The trade 
officials at U.S. Trade Representative and the EU’s Directorate General for Trade have 
equally supported the inclusion of antitrust within the WTO. Incorporating antitrust in the 
WTO would enhance trade officials’ powers as antitrust would become a “trade matter,” 
giving them the opportunity to ensure that antitrust laws are not employed so as to offset 
the liberalization commitments they have negotiated in the trade domain. Thus, the 
pursuit for antitrust cooperation has been agency-driven as opposed to interest-group 
driven.  
 
That agencies pursue regulatory cooperation contrary to the preferences of 
domestic interest groups departs from the standard political economy models, which 
assume that states are neutral aggregators of interest group preferences. Instead, the 
agency-driven antitrust cooperation suggests that states can be autonomous actors that 
develop preferences on their own and that pursue policy goals which do not necessarily 
reflect the demands of interest groups.85  
 
C. Linkage Explanation: Are Linkages Feasible and Will They Create or Destroy a 
Zone of an Agreement? 
 
1. Linkages Paving the Way for the TRIPs Agreement  
 
In the TRIPs negotiations, it was evident that the developed countries, where the 
majority of the R&D takes place, were going to be the beneficiaries of the agreement and 
                                                 
84 Free riding is not an option for a corporation whose interests are directly and individually at stake at a 
given investigation, as no other corporation has the interest of lobbying on its behalf. Note, however, that 
antitrust agencies can at times free ride on each other’s investigations. Developing countries, for instance, 
benefit if the United States or the EU blocks a merger that also impedes competition on that edeveloping 
country market.  
85 Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research, in BRINGING THE 
STATE BACK IN (Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer & Theda Skocpol eds., Cambridge 1985). 
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that the developing countries, where IP-protected products are mainly consumed or 
copied, were going to lose under the agreement.86 Thus, the main challenge in the TRIPs 
negotiations was to overcome the distributional conflict and win the support of the 
developing countries which had little to gain and much to lose under the TRIPs 
Agreement.  
 
Developing countries were eventually brought into the agreement by linking the 
TRIPs negotiations to concessions in other areas.87 As a transfer payment, developed 
countries agreed to cut down subsidies to their own farmers and lower their tariffs on 
agricultural products and textiles that the developing countries imported.88 This strategic 
linkage of two unrelated issues converted the “win-lose” bargaining game to a “win-win” 
game where developed and developing countries exchanged balanced concessions in the 
spirit of reciprocity.89  
 
This situation resembles a classic Prisoners’ Dilemma situation. Developing 
countries face a choice of either offering or refusing IP protection. Developed countries 
face a choice of either retaining the current level of their existing agricultural subsidies or 
reducing them. Developed countries could individually obtain the highest payoff by 
retaining their agricultural subsidies, if developing countries unilaterally agreed to a 
higher level of IP protection. In contrast, the developing countries would individually 
obtain the highest payoff by not enacting IP regulation yet having developed countries 
unilaterally cut their subsidies. Both parties’ best individual strategies, however, leave the 
other party with the lowest possible payoff. 
 
In this setting, both sets of countries prefer a mutual linkage where the developed 
countries cut subsidies and developing countries provide IP protection to a situation 
where developed countries maintain their subsidies and developing countries fail to 
provide IP protection. The mutual linkage also leads to the maximization of social 
welfare given that the combined payoff of the parties is higher than the payoff resulting 
from any other strategy. However, both parties retain an offensive and defensive 
incentive to defect from the linkage equilibrium in an effort to exploit the other party and 
increase their individual payoffs. Thus, the fear of the other party’s defection pulls both 
parties toward non-cooperative strategies.90 Thus, absent an agreement, the parties end up 
in a Pareto-deficient equilibrium where the developed countries retain their agricultural 
subsidies and developing countries fail to offer IP protection. 
 
                                                 
86 See Adede, supra note 46, at 4.  
87 Within the IP domain, few additional concessions were also given to the developing countries, including 
promises of technology transfer and transition periods that allow them to delay implementation of the 
TRIPs Agreement.  
88 Guzman, supra note 6, at 950-51. See Davis, supra note 24, at 9, 32.  
89 The successful conclusion of the TRIPs Agreement manifested the advantage of multi-issue negotiations 
and the strategic use of linkages. The agreement would not have been feasible in the institution such as the 
WIPO, which would have restricted the negotiations exclusively to the IP domain. The Linkage ensured 
that the final negotiation package offered some Pareto-gains for all states. 
90 Abbott, supra note 29, at 362.  
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Since both parties prefer an alternative equilibrium, either player can promise to 
eschew its dominant strategy if the other player reciprocates. Thus, developed countries 
can promise to cut down their agricultural subsidies if developing countries agree to offer 
IP protection. This mutually beneficial linkage allows both players to move from a 
Pareto-deficient equilibrium to one which offers both parties their second-best outcome. 
However, the new equilibrium is difficult to sustain, since both parties retain an incentive 
to defect from the agreement. Therefore, parties are likely to seek binding commitments 
and institutionalized rules to enforce the linkage in the event of a unilateral defection.91 
This need for credible, enforceable linkage commitments explains the relative 
attractiveness of the WTO in this particular strategic situation. 
 
While a strategic linkage in an institutionalized setting such as the WTO can be a 
powerful tool to solve a distributional conflict, the linkage strategy is not always feasible. 
The presence of ex ante transparency regarding the distributional consequences of the 
agreement forms an important precondition for the successful use of strategic linkages. 
To exchange reciprocal concessions and form issue-linkages, states must know which 
state ought to compensate the other and by how much. Thus, states must be able to 
identify the winners and losers from an agreement prior to its conclusion and have some 
sense of the magnitude of the gains and the losses that the agreement is expected to 
generate.92  
 
The distributional consequences of the TRIPs Agreement were sufficiently clear 
and quantifiable ex ante. For instance, the International Trade Commission estimated that 
the losses of 193 U.S.-based firms from piracy amounted to $ 23.8 billion in 1986, the 
year the Uruguay Round was launched. The EU estimated that counterfeiting comprises 
5–7 % of the world trade and accounts for the loss of 100,000 jobs annually in the EU.93 
While these estimates have been contested and the exact effect of the TRIPs Agreement 
and its ability to remove or mitigate these trends was debatable, a high degree of certainty 
remained regarding the magnitude of the benefits and losses that the TRIPs Agreement 
would bring about. Even more certain was the direction to which any compensation ought 
to flow. Information regarding the identities and the nationalities of all patent holders is 
transparent. Nobody disputed that the majority of the TRIPs beneficiaries resided in the 
developed countries whereas the majority of the TRIPs losers resided in the developing 
countries. As discussed above, 90% of new pharmaceutical products originate from the 
U.S., EU, or Japan, as do most other IP-driven products. These countries were known to 
be unambiguous winners of the TRIPs Agreement and thus expected to offer transfer 
payments to balance the concessions extracted from developing countries. Thus, the 
predictability of the Agreement’s distributional consequences paved the way for the 
linkages, which again paved the way for the conclusion of the Agreement.  
 
                                                 
91 Arthur Stein, The Politics of Linkage, 33 WORLD POL. 77-79 (1980).  
92 For instance, while a state can accurately calculate the distributional consequences of a tariff reduction 
(which is a quantifiable, sector-specific measure) or a removal of an export subsidy (both of which area 
quantifiable and firm- or sector-specific), it is more complicated to try to predict winners and losers under 
any prospective international antitrust agreement.  
93 Pugatch, supra note 45, at 58. 
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2. Distributional Uncertainty and the Infeasibility of Linkages to Facilitate the 
Antitrust Agreement 
 
Not unlike the TRIPs negotiations, antitrust cooperation has been marked by 
distributional tensions between the United States and the EU on one hand and between 
the developed and the developing countries on the other. Thus, unsurprisingly, linkages 
in the WTO have been proposed as a solution to overcome the distributional tensions in 
the antitrust domain. Proponents of the WTO antitrust agreement claim that existing 
distributional conflicts could be solved by compensating the losing states in another area 
of cooperation.94  
 
However, linkages are particularly difficult to devise in the antitrust context.95 
Unlike in the case of TRIPs, where IP producers comprised a clear group of winners and 
IP consumers comprised an equally unambiguous group of losers, the gains and losses 
available to the corporations that would be the targets of international antitrust regulation 
are ambiguous. The costs and benefits arising from an international antitrust agreement 
for its primary stakeholders are thus likely to be diffuse, issue- and case-specific and, in 
most cases, unpredictable. This type of distributional uncertainty obstructs states’ ability 
to exchange reciprocal concessions and form issue linkages.  
 
When corporations cannot predict which general policy will favor them more in 
the long run, they are less likely to support any all-embracing policy proposal.96 For the 
same reason that uncertainty relating to the distributional consequences inhibited the 
formation of a cohesive coalition to support the antitrust agreement, the uncertainty 
relating to the winners and the losers of the agreement has prevented the formation of 
issue linkages. If states do not know in advance who will ultimately win and who will 
lose from the agreement, it is impossible for them to assess the extent and the direction of 
any transfer payments to address those unknown distributional effects.  
 
In addition to showing how underlying distributional uncertainty can temper the 
usefulness of linkages, the failed antitrust negotiations highlight another challenge of the 
linkage strategy. Multi-issue negotiations are always more costly and cumbersome than 
single-issue negotiations. To devise linkages in the presence of such complexity is no 
small task.97 States need more information to assess the costs and benefits of various 
agreements. Adding new issues to the negotiation increases the bureaucracy involved as 
                                                 
94 Guzman, supra note 6.  
95Anu Bradford, International Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the WTO, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
383, 418-22 (2007). Domestic corporations have difficulties in ex ante determining whether they would 
benefit from a multilateral antitrust agreement. Any given corporation’s support for enhanced cooperation 
in merger or cartel enforcement, for instance, is likely to depend on whether they or their competitors are 
merging or, alternatively, are alleged to be participating in a collusive behavior. As firms cannot easily 
predict which general policy will favor them more in the long run, ex ante lobbying for any given all-
encompassing policy proposal is difficult. States are therefore not receieving any consistent domestic 
signals which could be translated into a coherent state policy on the issue. 
96Id., at 542–43. 
97 Sebenius, supra note 23, at 305. 
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new government agencies are brought to the bargaining table.98 Linkages are always 
counter-productive if the benefits generated by the linkage do not exceed the costs 
involved in bringing additional issues into the bargaining process.99 
 
Conventional political economy models often assume that negotiations do not 
have transaction costs. As long as losing parties can at least theoretically be compensated 
with the help of transfer payments, efficient agreements are expected to materialize. 
Linkages should therefore only facilitate negotiations. However, when transaction costs 
involved in issue linkages are introduced in the analysis, the contracting costs involved in 
negotiating multi-issue deals rise and prospect of reaching an agreement diminish.  
 
At worst, linkages can transform a simple bargaining situation into a complex, 
unsolvable one.100 While linkages are able to foster agreements which would otherwise 
fail due to distributional divisions, linkages can have the opposite effect of collapsing the 
entire negotiation, in particular when non-negotiable issues are brought to the negotiation 
table.101 New issues mobilize novel domestic interest groups with additional demands 
that can complicate negotiations. For instance, an initial decision between States A and B 
to link issues x and y to overcome their distributional conflict can create the need for 
additional transfer payments if interest groups in State C are also affected by y and 
demand the linking of issue z as a condition for accepting the agreement on issues x and 
y. The increase in the number of issues adds to the complexity of the transfer payments 
required for their joint solution, inevitably rendering the negotiations more difficult to 
manage.  
 
Linking antitrust negotiations to other “Singapore issues,” including trade 
facilitation, investment protection, and transparency in government procurement in 
addition to antitrust policy, contributed to the failure to launch negotiations on 
antitrust.102 In addition to antitrust, developing countries objected an agreement on 
investment and government procurement. However, developed countries, in particular the 
EU, refused to unpack the single undertaking and separate the Singapore Issues from one 
another, misestimating their ability to get developing countries on board to all the areas 
of contention.103 While antitrust negotiations had little chance of being saved at this 
point, the EU’s insistence in the package deal sealed the inevitable collapse of the 
negotiations.  
  
                                                 
98 T. Clifton Morgan, Issue Linkages in International Crisis Bargaining, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 311, 320 
(1990). 
99 Id. at 321.  
100 Sebenius, supra note 23. Davis, supra note 24. 
101 Davis, supra note 24, at 11. The other challenge is the difficulty of convincing all states that an 
agreement on issue A is conditional to reaching an agreement on issue B. If the single undertaking 
approach is relaxed in one individual negotiation the WTO, it is difficult to credibly convince the states that 
conditionality holds in subsequent rounds. See also James D. Morrow, Modeling the Forms of International 
Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information, 48 INT’L ORG. 387 (1994). 
102 See, e.g., Taimoon Stewart, The Fate of Competition Policy in Cancun: Politics or Substance?, 31 
LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 7, 7-11 (2004).  
103 Id. 
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3. Concluding Remarks on the Effects of a Linkage Strategy 
 
Both antitrust and TRIPs negotiations were marked by deep distributional 
conflicts. While linkages were successfully employed to resolve the distributional 
conflict in the case of TRIPs, they were unsuccessful in the case of antitrust.  Linkages 
can be a powerful tool to overcome a distributional conflict and forge an agreement when 
a consensus within a single issue area is not feasible. Many linked issues can promote 
cooperation, since there are more opportunities for mutual gains. Thus, the more palpable 
the distributional consequences underlying the issue, the more likely the states are to 
pursue its solution in the WTO through an issue linkage. In contrast, less controversial 
issues that do not present distributional conflicts are more likely to be resolved as a single 
issue in a bilateral context.104  
 
Linkages are not, however, always available to help states forge an agreement. 
When considerable uncertainty marks the negotiations, forming linkages is difficult, if 
not impossible. Preconditions for effective linkage bargains include predictability relating 
to the identity of winners and losers as well as some understanding of the magnitude of 
positive or negative consequences that an agreement is expected to generate. Thus, the 
WTO can only forge an agreement with the help of the linkage strategy when there is 
little uncertainty regarding the gains and losses that the agreement would generate. In 
addition to the problem of distributional uncertainty, sheer complexity introduced by 
issue linkages can sometimes offset the potential benefits of issue linkages. Multiple 
issues can obstruct progress on issues that could have been solved in isolation. At worst, 
too broad of a negotiation agenda can bring down an entire round, transforming a 
prospect of a grand bargain into a grand failure.105  
   
D.  Enforcement Explanation: How Likely is Opportunistic Behavior? 
 
The likelihood of opportunistic behavior is another key variable distinguishing 
international IP cooperation from international antitrust cooperation. When negotiating 
the TRIPs Agreement, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism was seen as crucial in 
ensuring that no state would defect from their international commitments.106 In contrast, I 
have elsewhere argued that the likelihood of cheating from international antitrust rules 
would be low.107 Consequently, the WTO’s enforcement powers were more germane in 
the context of international IP protection than they were in the case of international 
antitrust cooperation, further explaining why the TRIPs Agreement materialized in the 
WTO but the negotiations on WTO antitrust agreement stalled early in the process.  
 
 
                                                 
104 Davis, supra note 24, at 9. 
105 Sebenius, supra note 23, at 298.  
106 Sylvia Ostry, Intellectual Property Protection in the WTO: Major issues in the Millennium Round, 
Address at the Fraser Institute Conference in Santiago, Chile 2 (Apr. 19, 1999).  
107 See Piilola, supra note 3. 
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1. The Incentives to Defect from the TRIPs Agreement 
 
The WTO, and in particular its DSM, constitutes the most attractive venue for 
cooperation in PD situations when states are concerned about the prospect of cheating 
once the agreement is concluded.  In a PD situation, each state has the incentive to defect 
from the agreement, since it can increase its individual payoff by taking advantage of the 
other party’s cooperation while refusing to cooperate itself.   
 
Many international trade issues can be modeled as PDs.108 Consider, for example, 
the regulation of tariffs that states can employ at their borders. While all states would be 
better off under free trade, a state can shift the terms of trade in its favor by raising its 
tariffs while still benefiting from the low tariffs of its trading partner. In the absence of an 
international agreement proscribing such conduct (and an enforcement mechanism to 
guarantee states’ adherence to the agreement), states’ incentives to maximize individual 
payoffs at the expense of jointly optimal policies would lead to an equilibrium where all 
states would raise their tariffs, rendering every state worse off.  
 
The fear of defection was an important aspect of the strategic situation 
characterizing the TRIPs negotiations, leading developed countries to pursue legally 
binding, enforceable commitments within the WTO. Prior to the TRIPs Agreement, the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) provided a forum for negotiating 
international IPR rules.109 However, the WIPO failed to provide adequately strong 
substantive rules or a mechanism for their enforcement,110 which was the primary reason 
developed countries sought to move much of the international IP rulemaking from the 
WIPO to the WTO framework.  
 
Had states not linked the TRIPs Agreement to the other items on the trade agenda, 
the negotiations over IP would most likely have resembled a one-sided PD where 
developed countries and developing countries would have had different strategy sets and 
asymmetric payoffs. While the developing countries would have had both offensive and 
defensive incentives to cheat from their IP commitments, the developed countries would 
have only defected defensively by resorting to trade sanctions in response to developing 
countries’ defection.111 However, when the TRIPs negotiations were explicitly linked to 
negotiations on agricultural trade and trade in textiles, the one-sided PD was converted to 
a more classical symmetrical PD where the incentive to defect existed for both parties. 
Assuming the other party’s continuing cooperation, developed countries would have 
obtained the highest individual payoff by defecting from their commitment to cut down 
                                                 
108 See, e.g., JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 263 (1994). 
109 WIPO is a Specialized Agency of the United Nations. 
110 Frederick M Abbott, The Future of Multilateral Trading System in the Context of TRIPs, 20 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 661, 664 (1996).  
111 The developing countries opposed enhanced IP protection and would have had the incentive to defect 
from agreement if it was concluded. The developed countries, in contrast, had nothing to gain by defecting 
from the agreement themselves. Thus, while in a conventional PD both players would gain the highest 
individual payoff by defecting as long as the other player cooperated, in a one-sided PD developed 
countries’ best strategy is for both players to cooperate. Still, developing countries incentive to defect alone 
made DSM crucial, adding pressure to reach an agreement in the WTO framework. 
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agricultural subsidies. Similarly, developing countries would have obtained the highest 
individual payoff by defecting from their IP commitments. Thus, from the outset, the 
pursuit of the TRIPs Agreement within the WTO was motivated by the states’ ability to 
resort to the DSM to contain the other states’ incentives to defect from the agreement.  
 
When opportunistic behavior is likely and the availability of sanctions therefore 
relevant, it is still unclear why a powerful country would choose to pursue cooperation in 
the WTO instead of resorting to unilateral retaliation. If the United States and the EU 
could have pressured developing countries into adopting IP laws without offering any 
trade concessions in return, why did they turn to the WTO? Pursuing an agreement within 
the WTO seemed to have two downsides for the great powers: they were forced to offer 
transfer payments to the developing countries in return for extracting IPR commitments 
from them and, by subjecting themselves to the WTO’s DSM, the great powers curtailed 
their ability to unilaterally retaliate.  
 
For instance, instead of forming linkages in the WTO, the United States could 
have continued its previous practice of threatening developing countries with unilateral 
trade sanctions based on Section 301 of the United States Trade Act of 1974. Similarly, 
the United States could have threatened to further withdraw developing countries’ GSP 
privileges, which grants developing countries lower tariff rates if they import into 
developed countries. 
 
However, it is unclear whether unilateral threats (with the possibility of unilateral 
sanctions) are a better strategy for the United States or the EU than linkages backed by 
the WTO’s DSM. While there are examples of states offering higher levels of IP 
protection under unilateral great power pressure, such threats and sanctions have not been 
that effective overall. Developing countries’ record of complying with threats in the IP 
domain is mixed, reducing the United States and EU’s confidence that a mere threat 
would be sufficient to bring about desired regulatory changes. Meanwhile, aggressive 
unilateralism is also a costlier strategy to sustain in the long run.112  
 
2. The Self-Enforcing Nature of International Antitrust Cooperation 
 
Those who support a WTO antitrust agreement cite defection as an important 
reason to pursue a binding agreement. The existing literature seems to suggest that the 
strategic setting underlying international antitrust cooperation would have the 
                                                 
112 Other accounts have also been offered to explain why the great powers might forgo unilateralism in 
favor of WTO dispute settlement. Rachel Brewster, for instance, argues that the United States’ decision to 
forgo unilateral sanctions is explained by the President’s efforts to gain greater control vis-à-vis Congress 
over the content of U.S. trade policy. See generally Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in 
International Trade Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 251 (2006). See also Steinberg, supra note 7, at 342. Richard 
Steinberg has argued that great powers, including the United States and the EU, support the consensus 
based decision-making structures in the WTO, even though those structures yield more power for the 
weaker countries. According to him, current WTO rules create incentives for all states to reveal their 
preferences honestly. This gain creates a valuable information flow to great powers that can use the 
information to formulate proposals that reflect the interests of powerful states yet are acceptable by all 
members and, in the end, considered legitimate by them. 
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characteristics of a PD.113 Andrew Guzman, for instance, argues that in setting their 
domestic antitrust laws, states “externalize the costs and internalize the benefits of the 
exercise of market power across borders” to maximize their national interest.114 Guzman 
expects net-importer countries to employ stricter-than-optimal antitrust standards, since 
they decline to internalize costs that are borne by foreign producers that the strict antitrust 
laws target.115 Conversely, net-exporter countries enact laxer-than-optimal antitrust laws, 
since the costs of the lax enforcement fall on foreign consumers. The alleged existence of 
this type of “trade flow bias” leads Guzman to conclude that a WTO antitrust agreement 
is needed to overcome these sub-optimal domestic antitrust laws. Guzman also maintains 
that domestic antitrust enforcement is characterized by exemptions for domestic 
corporations (statutory bias) and discriminatory enforcement practices vis-à-vis foreign 
corporations (enforcement bias).  
 
I have elsewhere developed a detailed argument for why antitrust enforcement is 
not driven by trade flow bias, statutory bias, or a notable enforcement bias, and for why 
states are therefore less likely to behave opportunistically when enforcing their domestic 
antitrust laws.116 The argument on the alleged trade flow bias appears least convincing. 
The existence of “effects doctrine” as a basis for antitrust jurisdiction limits states’ ability 
to engage in such a bias. No state enjoys an exclusive jurisdiction to in antitrust cases.117 
Regardless of the nationality or location of a corporation, every state with an antitrust law 
is entitled to establish antitrust jurisdiction on a corporation, as long as the anti-
competitive conduct of that corporation has an “effect” in the domestic market of that 
particular country.118 Thus, a net-exporter’s ability to strategically enact overly lax 
antitrust laws that give a free pass on its exporters is compromised by the concurrent 
jurisdiction of the importing country. 
 
                                                 
113 While not applying game theoretic models in constructing his argument, Guzman implies that 
international antitrust cooperation would resemble a PD. See Guzman, supra note 38, at 101. See also 
Wolfgang Kerber & Oliver Budzinski, Competition of Competition Laws: Mission Impossible?, in 
COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT, supra note 38, at 31,44 (making a brief reference to the PD when 
discussing the current decentralized antitrust regime); Oliver Budzinski, Toward an International 
Governance of Transborder Mergers? Competing Networks and Institutions between Centralism and 
Decentralism, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 6-8 (2004) (arguing that a non-coordinated merger control 
regime can be characterized as a Prisoner’s Dilemma). 
114 Andrew T. Guzman, supra note 38, at 101. 
115 “Optimal” antitrust laws would be globally efficient as no state would engage in over- or under-
enforcement but would choose same antitrust laws as they would absent trade flows.   
116 Bradford, supra note 95, at 389-97. 
117 Antitrust can in this respect be contrasted with e.g., corporate law, where the internal affairs of the 
corporation are regulated exclusively by the laws of the state where the corporation was established.  This 
creates a very different dynamic and incentives for regulatory competition.  
118 The United States and the EU in particular have applied their antitrust laws to the conduct of foreign 
corporations as long the conduct has had an “effect” on their domestic market. See, e.g., United States v. 
Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945); T-102/96, Gencor Ltd v Commission, 25 March 1999, [1999] 
ECR II-0753, ¶¶ 89-92 (CFI). However, also many other nations today recognize the legitimacy of 
applying their antitrust laws to the conduct of foreign firms as long as some anti-competitive effect is felt 
on the market of the country willing to exercise jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 415 reporters’ note 9 (1987). 
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The arguments about alleged statutory bias seem more plausible, but a closer 
examination of domestic antitrust statutes shows this type of bias to be rare in practice. 
Domestic antitrust statutes do not explicitly favor local firms over foreign ones. However, 
several jurisdictions do exempt export cartels119 from their antitrust laws, which could 
amount to an example of a statutory bias. The opportunistic antitrust policies embedded 
in the export cartel exemptions are nonetheless mitigated, since the importing country can 
always target the export cartel under its own antitrust laws if competition on the 
importing country’s domestic market is adversely affected.120 The country exempting 
export cartels from its jurisdiction cannot therefore effectively shield its cartel from 
another country’s antitrust investigation. Moreover, since export cartel exemptions are 
increasingly rare today, they are unlikely to significantly impede competition and 
international trade.121 Consequently, the PD incentives associated with export cartels 
hinder international antitrust cooperation marginally, at best. 
 
It seems conceivable that antitrust enforcers might deliberately overlook the anti-
competitive conduct of domestic corporations in individual instances while 
disproportionately targeting foreign corporations. Suspicions in this regard were 
reinforced when the EU in 2001 prohibited a proposed acquisition involving two U.S.-
based companies, Honeywell and General Electric, after the U.S. authorities had already 
approved the acquisition. The EU’s decision added force to accusations that the EU 
antitrust enforcement protected European interests and was hostile toward U.S. 
corporations.122 A broader inquiry into the EU antitrust authorities’ merger decisions, 
however, does not reveal any systematic bias against U.S. corporations. In fact, while 
twenty-five of the merger notifications the EU Commission received in 1995-2005 
involved at least one U.S.-based company, only twelve percent of the prohibited mergers 
involved a U.S. corporation. Similarly, only seventeen percent of the mergers that were 
withdrawn after the notification involved a U.S. corporation, twenty-six percent of the 
Commission’s initiated phase II investigations (“second request”) involved a U.S. 
corporation, and twenty-seven percent of the conditional clearances were granted in cases 
that involved a U.S. company. These numbers suggest that any enforcement bias would 
be limited to a small number of individual cases, or that enforcement bias may not even 
exist. 
                                                 
119 Export cartel refers to an agreement or other arrangement between two or more firms to charge a 
specified export price or to divide export markets among them. The difference to a normal cartel is that the 
collusive behavior is restricted to goods or services that are exported to foreign markets.  
120EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 1101 (Foundation 
2007). This argument, however, assumes that the importing country is vested with adequate enforcement 
capacity and can hence be problematic if the prosecution of the export cartel requires evidence that is 
located in the exporting jurisdiction or if the importing jurisdiction cannot impose effective remedies.   
121 See Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, The Changing International Status of Export Cartel 
Exemptions, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 785, 793,796 (2005). Levenstein and Suslow note that over the last 
three decades, the number of export cartels exemptions have declined from 180 to zero in Japan, from 
sixty-nine to four in Australia, from 227 to zero in Germany. The only country that continues to provide a 
large number of exemptions is the United States.  
122See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Divestitures in Merger Between 
General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8140.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2010); Commission 
decision of 3 July 2001, General Electric/Honeywell, Case COMP/M.2220.  
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In the absence of strong incentives for opportunistic behavior, I have argued that 
international antitrust cooperation has been obstructed by the existence of a distributional 
problem as opposed to a defection problem.  The distributional problem arises when the 
costs and the benefits of an international antitrust agreement would be unevenly 
distributed among states. In this coordination game (“CG”) setting states expect to benefit 
from a coordinated global antitrust regime but fail to agree on the type of regime that 
ought to be adopted. This conflict over the focal point of coordination makes an 
agreement difficult to reach. 
 
For instance, both the United States and the EU acknowledge that a more 
harmonized international antitrust regime could reduce transaction costs and increase 
economic efficiency and legal certainty. Both countries expect to benefit from a more 
effective pursuit of international cartels and dominant companies whose conduct span 
across several markets. Similarly, harmonized merger control procedures would lead to 
transaction cost savings, diminish delays, and improve legal certainty, since corporations 
would not face multiple jurisdictions with different substantive and procedural antitrust 
regimes. Thus, international coordination is assumed to generate aggregate and individual 
benefits for both the United States and the EU. The two antitrust powers, however, 
disagree as to the precise content and the form of the international agreement.123 While 
the United States would like all countries to converge to the U.S. model of antitrust laws, 
the EU prefers convergence to its own antitrust laws. This is the distributional problem 
that undermines their ability to pursue coordination despite the gains coordination is 
expected to produce. Thus, international antitrust cooperation resembles a coordination 
game with distributional consequences (“CG”) rather than a PD.124   
 
The distributional conflict between developed countries and developing countries 
similarly stems from the disagreement over the content of the contemplated international 
antitrust agreement.  While developed countries call for a reduction of transaction costs 
and enhanced market access, developing countries are concerned about their inability to 
control the anti-competitive practices of MNCs and the need to shield their local 
corporations from international competition.125 Thus, the coordination game between 
                                                 
123 The EU has been the strongest advocate of WTO antitrust rules whereas the United States has endorsed 
voluntary antitrust cooperation within the ICN. See Mario Monti, A Global Competition Policy?, Address 
at the European Competition Day Conference (Sept. 17, 2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/index_speeches_by_the_commissioner.html (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2010; Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Communication 
from the European Community and Its Member States, WTO Doc. W/WGTCP/W/115 (May 25, 1999); See 
ICPAC Report, supra note 56, at 33; William J. Kolasky, Global Competition: Prospects for Convergence 
and Cooperation, Address at the American Bar Association Fall Forum (Nov. 7, 2002), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200446.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2010). 
124 Bradford, supra note 95, at 514. (discussing the likelihood of discriminatory decisions by domestic 
antitrust authorities and noting that the inquiry into the EU Commission’s merger control practices does not 
support the claim that there would be a general bias against foreign corporations).  
125 Bernard M. Hoekman & Kamal Saggi, International Cooperation on Domestic Policies: Lessons from 
the WTO Competition Policy Debate, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MULTILATERAL TRADE 
COOPERATION 439, 446 (Simon J. Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2006); Ajit 
Singh & Rahule Dhumale, Competition Policy, Development, and Developing Countries, in WHAT GLOBAL 
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developed countries and developing countries could be formalized similarly to the game 
between the United States and the EU, likewise resulting in two possible equilibria.  
 
Unlike in a PD situation, where a state can obtain a higher individual payoff by 
deviating from agreed commitments, an agreement that has been attained in a CG setting 
is largely self-enforcing, since neither party has an incentive to renege on its 
commitments. Once the agreement is reached, sustaining cooperation in a CG is easier 
than in a PD due to the absence of incentives to cheat. The low likelihood of 
opportunistic behavior also renders any formal enforcement mechanism less useful. 
Assuming that international antitrust cooperation indeed predominantly resembles a CG 
rather than a PD, the WTO’s DSM is expected to be of limited relevance for antitrust 
negotiations. Thus, it is not surprising that states let the WTO antitrust negotiations fail 
and focused their efforts to pursue non-binding antitrust cooperation outside of the WTO 
framework instead.  
 
Two caveats are in order. First, while deliberate cheating is likely rare, developing 
countries’ capacity constraints, including a lack of enforcement institutions and antitrust 
expertise, might lead to an occasional unintentional defection from international antitrust 
commitments. However, to the extent that states’ defection can be traced to capacity 
constraints rather than to intentional violation of the agreement, a binding agreement with 
enforcement provisions would be unlikely to bring greater compliance. Capacity building 
in the form of technical assistance is likely to yield better results vis-à-vis developing 
countries whose inadequate regulatory capacities renders compliance with the 
contemplated agreement difficult. 126 Second, occasional intentional defection can occur 
in CG if a state wants to shift the point of coordination to its preferred equilibrium.127 
However, this type of defection from the established equilibrium can be distinguished 
from cheating in a PD situation for the defecting state in a CG setting would need to 
make the defection public in order to force other states move to the new equilibrium.  
 
Accordingly, in the case of antitrust cooperation, the primary concern was and 
remains how to overcome the distributional conflict in the first place, not how to deter 
defection and sustain the focal point of coordination once states have settled on one. This 
provided states with a rationale for steering away from the WTO and its DSM. When 
opportunistic behavior is expected to be limited, states consider non-binding agreements 
adequate, especially since such agreements are often faster and cheaper to negotiate. 
  
3. Concluding Remarks on the Enforcement Explanation 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
ECONOMIC CRISIS? 122, 127 (Philip Arestis, Michelle Baddeley & John McCombie eds., Palgrave 
Macmillan 2001). 
126 Abraham Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175, 197-204 (1993).  The 
Chayes & Chayes’ argument for a “managerial model of compliance,” which rests on transparency, 
capacity building, and persuasion rather than on enforcement and sanctions, seems particularly suitable for 
ratcheting up antitrust standards in developing countries.  
127 See Lisa L. Martin, Interests, Power, and Multilateralism, 46 INT’L ORG. 765, 776 (1992) (distinguishing 
this type of departure from the established equilibrium from cheating as the defecting state would need to 
make the defection public in order to force other states move to the new equilibrium). 
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The negotiation history of the TRIPs Agreement illustrates the intrinsic value that 
the WTO can add to the process of negotiating international agreements. The primary 
advantage of negotiating an agreement under the auspices of the WTO lies in the 
institution’s ability to solve a PD. Absent the ability to exchange credible and enforceable 
commitments, states would pursue sub-optimal policies in a PD setting. Thus, negotiating 
the TRIPs Agreement within the WTO gave states the necessary guarantees on other 
states’ future behavior, leading all states to abandon their dominant, non-cooperative 
strategies and move toward an equilibrium that maximized social welfare. In contrast, the 
WTO does not add similar value to the pursuit of antitrust convergence in a CG setting 
where states always have the incentive to pursue a strategy that maximizes social welfare. 
Either focal point in the CG constitutes a Pareto-optimal outcome. While the WTO might 
help states choose between the two focal points, the greatest institutional advantage of the 
WTO—its ability to enforce compliance—is not called for by the strategic structure of 
the CG.   
 
E. Cost-Benefit Explanation: Are the Net Benefits of Cooperation and the 
Opportunity Costs of Non-Cooperation High?  
 
As shown above, the benefits of a TRIPs Agreement were perceived as extremely 
high for the developed countries that were unambiguous beneficiaries of the Agreement. 
Similarly, the discussion below reveals that the opportunity costs of not cooperating in 
the intellectual property domain in the WTO were much higher than the costs of 
maintaining a decentralized antitrust regime.  Thus, the difference in the net benefits of 
WTO cooperation and the opportunity costs of forgoing WTO negotiations further 
explains the successful conclusion of the TRIPs Agreement and the failure to reach a 
WTO antitrust agreement.  
 
1. The High Benefits of the TRIPs Agreement and the Absence of Alternatives 
 
In the case of TRIPs negotiations, stakes were high and alternatives few. It is 
virtually impossible for states to rely on their domestic IP laws to curtail abuses of IPRs 
that take place abroad.  Multilateral solutions were therefore indispensable. At the same 
time, existing multilateral venues prior to the TRIPs had proved inadequate. Indeed, it 
was their dissatisfaction with WIPO that led powerful states and their domestic interest 
groups to demand for an alternative regime. Most importantly, the WIPO lacked the tools 
for effective enforcement, which increased the relative attractiveness of negotiating the 
TRIPs Agreement in the WTO.  
 
At times, international institutions are not necessary for achieving greater 
convergence. Some areas of cooperation are conducive to “market-based harmonization” 
whereby states’ regulatory regimes converge even if there is no international agreement 
that calls for such convergence. Beth Simmons has demonstrated how the interplay 
between two variables—the extent of negative externalities and the countries’ incentives 
to emulate—determine whether formal legal institutions are necessary for achieving 
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convergence.128 Her model assumes that there is a “dominant center,” which is often a 
great power that is a primary regulator in the field. In the case of IP regulation, the 
dominant center consists of the United States and the EU. If the decentralized regulatory 
framework creates negative externalities, the United States and the EU are expected to 
want the other countries to converge to the regulatory model they embrace. If the United 
States and the EU seek harmonization, they have the choice of pursuing cooperation 
within an international institution such as the WTO or waiting for other countries to 
adjust to the U.S.-EU domestic regulatory framework with little, if any, institutionalized 
pressure. A chosen strategy hinges on the other countries’ incentives to emulate their 
regulation; with a high incentive to emulate, institutions are not necessary whereas with a 
low incentive to emulate, institutions are central in bringing about the desired 
convergence.  
 
In the case of TRIPs, the extent of negative externalities stemming from 
developing countries’ inadequate IP protection was extremely high. At the same time, 
developing countries had very low incentives to emulate the United States and the EU, 
given that high IP protection would impose costs and offer no benefits to them. Efforts to 
achieve IP converge therefore forms a prime example of regulatory convergence that is 
driven though institutions; here through centralized pressure at the WTO. 
 
2. The Low Net Benefits of the WTO Antitrust Agreement and the Existence of 
Alternatives  
 
 States had a much higher tolerance for the status quo in the case of antitrust than 
they did in the case of IP cooperation. I have elsewhere argued that one of the reasons 
antitrust negotiations have failed in the WTO is that the agreement was perceived to 
generate low net benefits.129 Compared to the TRIPs Agreement, which was considered a 
high-stakes agreement for its proponents, the enthusiasm for the antitrust agreement was 
tempered by the agreement’s low (and in any event more uncertain) expected benefits 
relative to the costs of negotiating the agreement in the WTO.  
 
A WTO agreement is more likely if it provides states with large net benefits at a 
relatively low cost. The reason states may have concluded that the pursuit of international 
antitrust cooperation in the WTO would not render high net benefits comes from three 
factors. First, the extent of aggregate benefits available from cooperation is uncertain and 
possibly not as great as generally presumed. Second, adjustment costs under a binding 
international agreement are likely to be high, in particular when compared to the 
uncertain benefits stemming from cooperation. Third, the opportunity costs of non-
cooperation are relatively low, particularly for the key states with strong, existing 
domestic antitrust laws.  
 
With respect to the aggregate benefits from cooperation, many commentators 
advocating binding international antitrust rules presume that such rules would lead to 
                                                 
128 Beth Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: the Case of Capital Market Regulation, 55 
INT’L ORG 589-620 (2001). 
129 See discussion on a deadlock as a reason for the collapse of negotiations in Bradford, supra note 95.  
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significant transaction-cost savings. These presumptions are intuitively appealing but 
have not been demonstrated empirically.130 While it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
quantify the inefficiencies embedded in the current regime, some recent research suggests 
that at least some costs in this regard might have been exaggerated. For example, a recent 
survey of international mergers calls into question the commonly held view that the 
multi-jurisdictional merger review would lead to significant transaction costs.131 Another 
study suggests that anti-competitive practices may not constitute significant strategic non-
tariff barriers as commonly believed.132 And while few high profile cases, including the 
prohibited acquisition involving GE and Honeywell133 or the contested merger between 
Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas,134 have heightened fears of inconsistent decisions by 
different antitrust authorities, enforcement conflicts appear rare in practice.135 Finally, the 
benefits of the WTO antitrust agreement are further diminished if national bias in 
domestic antitrust enforcement is likely to be less prevalent than often presumed, as 
claimed above in Part D.136   
 
                                                 
130 SIMON J. EVENETT & ALEXANDER HIJZEN, CONFORMITY WITH INTERNATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
MERGER REVIEWS: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON “SOFT LAW” 25. (University of Nottingham Research 
Paper No. 2006/04,2006) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=893034 (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2010). 
131 See Multi-Jurisdictional Merger Survey, supra note 79. The survey of over sixty international M&A 
deals in 2003 found that “a typical international merger is worth € 3.9 ($ 5.1) billion, requires six filings 
with a merger review authority and generates on average € 3.3. ($ 4.3) million in external merger review 
costs—it takes on average seven months to complete.” While the survey confirmed that the multiple merger 
review process imposes additional transaction costs on merging parties, those costs do not seem significant 
when compared to the overall value of the transaction. In fact, the average (external) transaction costs 
attributable to the merger review were found to constitute merely 0.11 percent of the total costs of the deal. 
Transaction costs of this magnitude are unlikely to have a significant impact on the decision whether to 
proceed with a transaction.  
132 See Diane Manifold & William Donnelly, A Compilation from Multiple Sources of Reported Measures 
Which May Affect Trade, in QUANTITATIVE METHODS FOR ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF NON-TARIFF 
MEASURES AND TRADE FACILITATION 41–50 (Philippa Dee & Michael Ferrantino eds., World Scientific 
2005). (discussing the data collected by the U.S. International Trade Commission on the relative 
harmfulness of various NTBs that are expected to impede the free flow of goods and services. The data 
implies that government tolerated anti-competitive practices do not constitute a major market access 
barrier, at least relative to other NTBs that governments have at their disposal to deter entry).  
133 See Justice Department Requires Divestitures in Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell, 
supra note 55.  
134 See Commission Decision 97/816 of 30 July 1997, Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas, Case No. IV/M.877, 
1997 O.J. (L 336) 16; Boeing Co., et al., Joint Statement Closing Investigation of the Proposed Merger, 5 
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,295 (July 9, 1997). 
135 The GE/Honeywell decision remains the only merger case in which the U.S. and EU authorities reached 
a conflicting decision. The EU also prohibited a proposed merger between DeHavilland and ATR, which 
was approved by the Canadian authorities. (See Commission Decision of 2 October 1991, Aerospatiale-
Alenia/de Havilland, Case No. IV/M.053. Legal uncertainty resulting from multi-jurisdictional merger 
review is thus unlikely to form as significant negative externality as the theoretical possibility of 
enforcement conflicts would suggest. It is, however, difficult to evaluate the costs of the exiting prospect—
no matter how unlikely in practice—that any given merger indeed has a higher risk of being prohibited as a 
result of multiple regulatory reviews.  
136 Bradford, supra note 95, at 514. (referring to statistics on the EU merger control practices and arguing 
that they do not show national bias against U.S. corporations). 
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Negotiating and implementing a binding WTO antitrust agreement would also be 
costly, reducing the net benefits from its success. Contracting costs involved in the 
pursuit of a binding agreement under the auspices of the WTO would be significant due 
to numerous parties, multiple negotiation rounds and extensive multi-issue bargaining.137 
In addition, compliance costs associated with implementing and enforcing international 
antitrust rules would be high, in particular for developing countries that lack the 
institutional capacity, technical expertise, and financial resources to establish 
sophisticated antitrust regimes. Similar costs were also present in the TRIPs negotiations. 
However, in the case of TRIPs, the high costs were more than offset by yet much higher 
benefits for the key parties to the negotiations.  
 
Despite the high costs of negotiating a WTO antitrust agreement, one might argue 
that the costs of pursuing cooperation outside of the WTO could be even higher. Non-
binding antitrust cooperation today consists of a myriad of different bilateral, plurilateral, 
and multilateral governance instruments, all typically focusing only on some subset of 
substantive or procedural antitrust matters. While various non-binding agreements may 
involve relatively low contracting costs individually, the number of different non-binding 
agreements that would be required to cover the range of issues and parties that a potential 
WTO agreement could embrace would be high. These multiple non-binding instruments 
among different parties, taken together, could be costlier than a single binding 
international antitrust agreement, assuming such an agreement was feasible to negotiate. 
At the same time, while the ex post costs of a single, all-embracing, and successfully 
concluded WTO grand bargain could be lower than a myriad of separate single-issue 
agreements, states’ ex ante risk-adjusted perception of the costs of a multi-issue 
negotiations is significantly higher. This is true in particular given the greater likelihood 
of failure in such negotiations and costs involved in the collapse of a large scale 
negotiation agenda. 
 
Finally, the opportunity costs in the absence of a WTO antitrust agreement are 
distinctly low due to the variety of other solutions available for states. States with 
existing, well-functioning antitrust regimes are often able to exercise jurisdiction vis-à-
vis foreign corporations as long as the allegedly anti-competitive conduct of the 
corporations has an effect on their domestic market.138 Both the United States and the EU 
have resorted to extraterritorial enforcement on several occasions.139 This ability to 
engage in extraterritorial enforcement makes the case for an international agreement less 
compelling.  States can also solve many of the collective action problems through 
bilateral cooperation agreements and existing informal cooperation mechanisms. These 
alternative forms of antitrust cooperation have enhanced international cooperation, 
aligned domestic antitrust laws, and contributed to a significant proliferation of antitrust 
                                                 
137 Abbott & Snidal, supra note31, at 434. See also discussion infra at III.A.1.  
138 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Insurance v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993); Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 
116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio and others v. Commission (“Wood Pulp”), Sept 27, 
1988, [1988] ECR 5193 (ECJ). 
139 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Insurance v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993); Wood Pulp,[1988] ECR at 
###. Obviously, the status quo option entails some transaction costs (including the possibility of 
enforcement conflicts akin to the GE/Honeywell case).  
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regimes around the world. At the same time, these alternative regimes have further 
reduced the need for a binding international antitrust regime.  
 
Thus, antitrust cooperation is an issue area that is conducive to market-based 
harmonization. The extent of negative externalities generated by decentralized antitrust 
regimes is uncertain and in any event likely to be lower than they were in the case of the 
decentralized IP regime. In addition, developing counties and emerging markets have an 
incentive to emulate more established antitrust regimes. They have actively sought to 
copy developed country antitrust laws in order to strengthen the operation of their 
domestic markets and to curtail anti-competitive conduct of multinational corporations 
that conduct business in their markets. In some areas of antitrust, where there seem to be 
more obvious negative externalities, states complement market-based harmonization with 
“softer” institutional assistance such as developing non-binding guidelines and best 
practices within institutions like the ICN. In either case, antitrust cooperation does not 
seem to call for strong, centralized cooperation in the WTO.  
 
Consequently, while a binding international antitrust agreement would be 
expected to create benefits in the form of transactional efficiencies, the high costs of 
WTO cooperation together with limited expected gains and the availability of alternatives 
explain why states have chosen to pursue other regulatory priorities in the WTO, and 
preferred other paths when seeking international antitrust convergence.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has sought to explain when an international legal framework like the 
WTO can facilitate international cooperation. Through an empirical enquiry into IP and 
antitrust cooperation, it has endeavored to provide a more nuanced understanding on the 
limits of the WTO’s expansionism to new areas of regulatory cooperation.  
 
By contrasting the successfully concluded TRIPs Agreement with the failed 
antitrust negotiations, this Article has challenged the prevailing view that the TRIPs 
Agreement offers an instructive precedent for antitrust negotiations in the WTO. A closer 
examination of the strategic situation underlying the TRIPs and the antitrust negotiations 
reveals that the two areas of cooperation have little in common.  
 
The strategic situations characterizing international antitrust and IP cooperation 
differ in several ways. First, the general preconditions that underlie all successful efforts 
to cooperate internationally were met in the case of the TRIPs negotiations, but not in the 
case of antitrust negotiations. While the great powers unanimously supported the TRIPs 
Agreement, comparable consensus was missing in the case of antitrust. Similarly, 
influential interest groups within the great powers supported the TRIPs Agreement, but 
showed little enthusiasm for the antitrust agreement. In the absence of political rents that 
could be captured by major trading powers, the likelihood of reaching an antitrust 
agreement was dim.  
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In addition, the WTO’s institutional advantages were directly relevant for the 
TRIPs Agreement, but did little to solve the problems underlying international antitrust 
cooperation. In particular, the unequal distributional consequences of the TRIPs 
Agreement were solvable through issue linkages. However, similar linkages could not 
solve the antitrust negotiations, since there was ex ante uncertainty regarding the winners 
and losers under the prospective antitrust agreement. In addition, the risk of opportunism 
and the consequent need for an enforcement mechanism was prevalent in the case of 
TRIPs, but trivial in the case of antitrust. This rendered the WTO’s dispute settlement 
mechanism germane for the TRIPs negotiations but only marginally useful for the 
antitrust negotiations. Finally, in the case of TRIPs, both the net benefits of cooperation 
and the opportunity costs of non-cooperation within the WTO were high because there 
were few alternative regulatory regimes, while the opposite was true for the antitrust 
agreement. Taken together, these reasons contributed to the successful conclusion of the 
TRIPs Agreement and the failure of antitrust negotiations in the WTO. 
 
The inquiry into the differences between IP and antitrust cooperation also calls 
into question the conventional wisdom that the TRIPs Agreement provides a useful 
template for WTO negotiations in other areas of regulatory cooperation. The dynamics 
underlying antitrust cooperation have been presumed to be most similar to those 
underlying IP cooperation, making antitrust the most obvious next issue that the WTO 
can incorporate within its framework. Yet, despite the similarity of antitrust to trade, 
efforts to coordinate antitrust policy through the WTO have failed. This suggests that a 
careful inquiry into the strategic situation characterizing the regulation of corruption, 
investment, labor or environment would be required before one can assume that other 
issues can be incorporated into the WTO following the example set by the TRIPs 
Agreement. Rather than providing a template for future negotiations, the TRIPs 
Agreement may be more appropriately viewed as a product of an idiosyncratic set of 
conditions which are unlikely to be replicated in other areas of cooperation.   
 
Disaggregating the conditions that make cooperation in the WTO feasible is also 
helpful when looking at the future prospects of cooperation in the WTO. States’ ability to 
cooperate within the WTO is likely to become increasingly difficult in the future, 
suggesting that the failed antitrust negotiations may be more predictive than the TRIPs 
negotiations on the future boundaries of the WTO.  The political-economy landscape 
underlying WTO negotiations is growing into an increasingly complex one, undermining 
the conditions which made WTO agreements feasible in the past. This applies across the 
key variables to WTO’s success identified above.  
 
For instance, great power consensus is becoming increasingly difficult to establish 
and sustain today. The formerly tight U.S.-EU alliance has gradually weakened following 
the end of the Cold War.140 This has had an impact on all areas of cooperation, including 
trade.141 The United States and EU’s capacity to exercise leadership has also declined due 
to a growing domestic resistance to the WTO’s agenda in both countries. Consequently, 
the United States and EU’s increasingly limited abilities to secure domestic ratification 
                                                 
140 Daniel K. Tarullo, The End of the Big Trade Deal, 46 INT’L ECON. 46, 48 (2006). 
141 Id. 
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for WTO agreements have forced them to retract from their active roles as drivers of 
WTO cooperation.142  
 
Achieving consensus among the great powers has also become more complicated 
as China and other emerging economies have begun to challenge the United States and 
the EU’s economic dominance. A U.S.-EU accord is likely to remain a necessary, but 
possibly not sufficient, precondition for a WTO agreement. Instead, a consensus must be 
sought among a greater number of increasingly heterogeneous states as the emerging 
trade powers weigh in more forcefully when setting the negotiation agenda and when 
bargaining over the terms of the specific agreements. China and India, for instance, have 
already been able to block progress in WTO negotiations where proposed agreements fail 
to incorporate their interests and priorities. At the same time, they have shown little 
willingness to step in and assume genuine leadership role in moving the WTO 
negotiations forward.143  
 
Future negotiations within the WTO may face an additional challenge if powerful 
interest groups benefiting from trade liberalization shift their lobbying activity to other 
venues. Given the recent difficulties in moving forward with the Doha Round of trade 
talks, pressure groups might increasingly perceive that the WTO is no longer apt to open 
global markets. Instead, they may urge their governments to negotiate bilateral and 
regional agreements, which are faster, more certain, and more manageable to negotiate. 
In the past seven years while the Doha negotiations have been hobbling along fruitlessly, 
bilateral and regional trade agreements have continued to proliferate.144 These 
agreements have further lowered the opportunity costs of non-WTO agreements, 
reinforcing the shift from global trade deals to regional and bilateral ones.  
 
Another reason for United States and EU multinationals’ vanishing support for 
the WTO process is that these companies have already managed to reap the most 
important benefits of trade liberalization. The past success of the WTO has delivered 
essentially all the market opening they need.145 These stakeholders used to be the most 
vocal supporters of the WTO’s agenda. Today, the loudest domestic voices are exercised 
by consumers and interest groups critical of the recent inroads the WTO has made in 
intervening with domestic regulatory policies such as IP protection and health 
measures.146  
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144 Approximately two hundred bilateral and regional trade agreements have been negotiated since the 
conclusion of the Uruguay round.  
145 Tarullo, supra note 140, at 48. 
146 For instance, the previously staunch coalition supporting the TRIPs Agreement has faced an emergence 
of a powerful counter-coalition that opposes the Agreement. As the magnitude of the HIV epidemic 
became more evident and, consequently, the question of access to affordable medicine more urgent, new 
interest groups demanding changes to the TRIPs Agreement were mobilized to counter the impact of the 
powerful IP lobby. As a result, the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health was adopted.  This 
presented an important setback for the TRIPs agenda earlier advanced by the great powers and the MNCs 
within those powers. 
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Issue linkages are also likely to become more difficult and risky in the subsequent 
WTO rounds. The “single undertaking” approach to WTO negotiations with multiple 
issue linkages has been a creative and at times an effective way of bringing controversial 
issues within the WTO. Insistence of package deals has ensured that states have signed 
on to agreements that fail to deliver direct benefits for them as long as they have been 
compensated in another area. However, the possibility of compromises unraveling 
increases with the number of players and the complexity of negotiation agendas. Thus, as 
compromises are sought among an even-greater number of increasingly heterogeneous 
players, the single undertaking approach is becoming questionable at best.  
 
The best argument for the continuing relevance of the WTO stems from its 
internationally unique ability to enforce legally binding commitments. Opportunistic 
behavior continues to characterize many areas of cooperation, and it is unlikely that 
protectionist tendencies will ever altogether vanish. However, a compelling argument can 
be made that cooperation dilemmas underlying international trade issues rarely resemble 
a PD today. For instance, it is no longer unambiguous whether imposing antidumping 
duties on Chinese products only hurts the Chinese and improves the United States’ terms 
of trade. Such duties also hurt the U.S. companies in China that export their products 
back to the United States. Similarly, given the rapid increase in trade in intermediate 
goods,147 duties on Chinese inputs also hurt the U.S. companies that buy and incorporate 
those Chinese inputs into their final products. Thus, the “unbundling” of the production 
chain has changed many states’ and interest groups’ perception that opportunistic 
behavior and protectionism serves their interests.148  It has also paved the way for 
unilateral trade liberalization, challenging the conventional assumption that international 
trade is always impeded by protectionist impulses and that such impulses need to be 
curtailed through hard law and threats of sanctions.  
 
Finally, while some attempts to conclude the Doha Round have failed because 
there were too many controversial issues, more recent rounds have failed partly because 
of the lack of inclusion of issues with satisfactory net gains for all parties. The Doha 
negotiation agenda is now stripped of much of its initial ambition since states have 
narrowed the agenda to save the failing round. Thus, where the net benefits available 
from a WTO round are perceived as inadequate, states are likely to abandon the WTO 
and pursue more substantial commitments with a smaller group of like-minded trading 
partners.  
 
Where does this leave the prospect of cooperation within the WTO, going 
forward? One scenario on the future limits of the WTO is that governments have already 
picked the low-hanging fruit and thereby satisfied the most salient needs of their 
powerful interest groups, leaving a dwindling pool of uncertain and contested benefits for 
states to negotiate. These remaining benefits are also more difficult to agree upon among 
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distinctly heterogonous trade powers. This would marginalize the WTO’s role with 
respect to future liberalization commitments and leave the institution in the role of 
adjudicating disputes stemming from existing agreements.149 This scenario suggests that 
the WTO may well have met its limits and that we are unlikely to see new agreements 
incorporated within its framework.  
 
Another scenario is that the gains available through bilateral and regional trade 
agreements do not make the WTO obsolete. Under this scenario, it is assumed that 
protectionism resurges and continues to span across global markets. New trade barriers 
are erected. Eliminating them creates losers and causes resistance, which can only be 
overcome through transfer payments that the WTO can facilitate.  Opportunistic behavior 
continues to characterize many areas of cooperation. In these areas, the WTO is likely to 
remain as a useful forum in which to negotiate enforceable commitments among many 
states. In this respect, states have few alternatives to the WTO. This view predicts that the 
WTO will remain the central pillar of the world trade system and continue to attract the 
negotiation of new issues under its umbrella. However, if states continue to seek trade 
liberalization through the WTO, they need to carefully weigh the costs and the benefits of 
its current decision-making structures, including its insistence on the single undertaking 
and its requirement that all states need to sign onto all agreements.  
 
Under either scenario, the WTO’s recent inability in furthering its liberalization 
agenda highlights the need for a more focused debate on the institution’s capabilities, 
goals and priorities.  The future prospects for cooperation within the WTO continue to 
hinge on the WTO’s perceived relevance in maintaining and strengthening free trade. At 
best, the above discussion not only helps shed light to the WTO’s ability to foster 
international agreements thus far, but it may also provide a starting point for a discussion 
on whether and how the institution might serve states’ future needs in an increasingly 
complex economic and political landscape.  
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